


third world

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Bimonthly • Number 6 • February/March 1987



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


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To the Reader

After the Falls

Our cover story this issue is an effort to analyze events in the Philippines, where a peace process is moving ahead at the same time that all sides seem to be attempting to gain the upper hand in the wake of the downfall of Ferdinand Marcos. After the attempted coup led by former Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, *third world* dispatched the editor of the Third World Guide, Roberto Remo Bissio, to Southeast Asia. Bissio, who is based in Montevideo, Uruguay, spent a month in the region, interviewing government officials, members of the armed opposition, labor activists and everyday Filipinos. He was invited to the northern region of Cordillera to witness the signing of a peace accord between the government and the guerrilla group.

The 600 kilometers he traveled to be the only foreign journalist at the ceremony were arduous ones. An eight hour bus ride was followed by a rocky four hour trip by jeep along dirt roads, interrupted by rivers which the vehicle had to be carried across by raft. Later, with the help of some Philippine friends, Bissio discovered a way into the "no man's land" of the United States Clark Air Force Base in order to give us a rare glimpse inside that installation.

Also in this issue, we feature a report on another country that recently rid itself of a hated dictator - Haiti. We are fortunate to count on the contribution of Gerard Pierre-Charles, a well-known Haitian Sociologist and political activist who recently returned to this native land after years of exile in Mexico.

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Editor: Carlos Castilho

Consulting Editor: Roberto Raposo

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Correspondents: Horacio Verbitsky (Argentina), Fernando Reyes Matta (Chile), Alejandra Adoum/Eduardo Khalifé (Ecuador), Rafael Ronzagliolo/César Arias Quincot (Peru), Guillermo Segovia Mora (Colombia), Arqueles Morales (Nicaragua), Ezevaldo Hipólito (Mozambique).

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Cover: Abaeté Propaganda

TO THE EDITORS :

Our library recently received issue number 4 of the English edition of your publication *third world*. We had previously been receiving *third world*, published by Periodistas del Tercer Mundo (Third World Journalists), based in Mexico City. We last received number 7, 1981, of that publication. Are the two publications connected in any way? If so, did the Mexico City publication cease with number 7 and your publication begin numbering from 1?

University of California
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The Mexican edition of *third world* and the new English edition are basically the same publication, written by the same group of journalists. The monthly Mexican edition was interrupted with number 7 in 1981, largely because of the transfer of our head offices to Rio de Janeiro. The magazine is now published by Cadernos do Terceiro Mundo, with headquarters in Brazil and representatives in Mexico City (Periodistas del Tercer Mundo), Lisbon, Portugal (Tricontinental



Editora), and Montevideo, Uruguay (ACU S.A.). Our English edition remained out of circulation from 1981 to 1986. Publication has now been resumed on a bimonthly basis but with the same editorial policy. For legal reasons, we were forced to resume publication with number 1. At present the magazine is produced in Brazil and printed and distributed in Lisbon. Our administrative and editorial offices are located in Rio de Janeiro, where readers should address their letters, which are always welcome. Distribution, including subscriptions and bulk orders, is handled in Lisbon, and all questions regarding such matters should be directed to the Lisbon office.

The Editors

MACHEL'S DEATH

I would like to express my deep regret for the tragic death of (Mozambican President) Samora Mache., who was cruelly murdered by South African racists (last October).

It is a known fact that the presidential plane was being monitored from takeoff in Lusaka by South African radar.

This raises two questions: Why did South African authorities take so long to arrive at the scene of the crash, and why did they wait until nine hours after the crash to inform authorities in Maputo?

Around the downed plane, the South African racists were so busy ransacking diplomatic pouches and stealing the money carried by the victims that the wounded did not arrive at the nearby hospitals until eleven hours after the crash. Many of them died because they did not receive timely medical assistance. According to some South African villagers, Machel was still breathing four hours after the accident. He was still alive.

This news led Pik Botha to go on TV the next day to say that an autopsy had revealed that Machel died instantly on the moment of impact. If so, why did the South African authorities take so long to announce that an autopsy had been done? I frankly doubt that any autopsy was performed. Meanwhile, the fascist and bourgeois press did all they could to defend their ideological boss.

In Portugal, the **Expresso** maintained that the airplane crashed because of lack of fuel,

when we all know that the presidential plane made a refueling stop in Mbala, Zambia. Pik Botha told the press that the airplane was old and equipped with outdated instruments. The truth, however, is that the aircraft was a 1980 Tupolev-134. Finally, the South Africans refused to send the plane's black boxes to Moscow, where they were to be decoded by a civil aviation probing committee.


**Fernando Mestre Patricio
Damaia, Portugal**

THE COMMUNITY IS ORGANIZING

I would like to ask **third world** to publish an article about community participation in different types of administrative actions at the local or municipal level, etc. I work with poor communities in the city of Buenos Aires, and it would help us in developing our projects to know how the people of other countries of the Third World have organized themselves in order to make up for the faults in a system that rarely is concerned with acting in the interest of the poor.

**Ricardo E. Gandolfi -
Buenos Aires, Argentina**

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Sea food for export

LEBANON

War Economy Collapsing

□ For the first time in eleven years, the specter of widespread scarcity of food is hovering over the war-torn nation of Lebanon. The country's economy is collapsing, and the government apparently lacks the ability to confront the situation.

Galloping inflation, low reserves of foreign exchange and the collapse of the Lebanese pound are threatening to throw the government into a crisis in the coming months, according to an announcement made by Finance Minister Camille Chamoun. "I predict that there will be a few more months (of solvency), but after that we will lack the

ability to finance the military, and the people will go hungry," remarked Chamoun. "Only God knows what will happen then."

The Lebanese economy withstood with vigor the first decade of war, but 1986 marked a drastic shift. Inflation reached 300 percent, and the domestic currency — which earlier this year had an exchange rate of 18 to one U.S. dollar — slipped to at least 100 per dollar in early January, without any indication of stabilizing. The country's scarce foreign reserves stand at a mere 500 million dollars.

Moreover, the value of the minimum salary dropped from US\$ 650 a month in 1982 to just US\$ 40, while personal income dropped 60 percent over the same period.


Another serious problem is a gasoline shortage,

which is having a particularly devastating effect during the vacation period, when automobiles generally fill the dark and dusty streets of east Beirut.

Bernard Fattal, head of the Lebanese Fattal Corporation and one of the country's most influential businessmen, does not see an end to the economic chaos. "People have lost confidence in the government during the last two years," he said. "Before, at least there was hope. Now nobody thinks the war is going to end.

"In 1984, everybody was investing here — the Iranians, the Iraqis, the Saudis, the Palestinians, everybody," continued the businessman. "There was no government, so there weren't any taxes either. Lebanon became one giant free port — the Hong Kong of the Middle East." Imports and exports became a new and lucrative trade. "Those who came in during the war took advantage of the lack of authority while the war wreaked havoc," he said.

However the strengthening of the dollar broke the Lebanese ability to import foreign goods, especially those from the United States and Europe. The business community noticed too late that the easy profits made from imports was ruining the country's



Lebanon's economy is suffering from the effects of the unending war.

Tricontinental Panorama

industrial base. Today, despite low labor costs and a mature export market, Lebanon must import 90 percent of its consumer goods and most of its foodstuffs.

In order to solve the food shortage, the government is considering a program patterned after one in the U.S. It is designed to assist 300,000 persons - if needed aid arrives from Europe. "The Western countries, especially the United States, have demonstrated their desire to help," noted a leader of one of the country's Christian factions. "But without centralized administration, there is nowhere to send the aid."

Meanwhile, the residents of Beirut are beginning to wonder how much longer they are going to have electrical service and running water. "The pipes are old, and the electricity is always going out," said a housewife. "One day we're going to wake up, and nothing will be working."

Although the crisis has hit hard all of the residents of Lebanon, the most affected are the Palestinians, who came here as refugees and whose semi-permanent presence was one of the factors that sparked the 1975 civil war. Attacks directed against the refugee camps by the Amal Shi'ite militia have caused casualties and

reduced them to mountains of debris. Trash is strewn in all directions and burning corpses litter the streets.

Given the seriousness of the country's plight, there appears to be little way for the government to recuperate its authority. If there is a solution, it may have to be initiated outside the borders of the war-ravaged country.

NAMIBIA

Life in the Township

There are very few elderly people in the black township of Katutura, located just outside the Namibian capital of Windhoek. "Most of our people die between 45 and 50 years of age," commented one resident.

Short life expectancy is but one of the problems facing the over 60,000 blacks

who live in the township, according to the results of a recently published survey conducted by the Social Sciences Research Centre of the Catholic Church. Unemployment stands at 43 percent, and those with jobs barely earn enough to support themselves and their families. As the survey points out, the "extremely low salaries force several families to live in the same house, the consequences of which are the total lack of privacy for couples, family disputes and other social problems leading to tensions and frustrations." Marital breakdowns, alcoholism, drug addiction and crime are all on the rise.

The spending power of these low salaries is reduced even further by the fact that African-style open markets, where food can be purchased more cheaply than in supermarkets, are banned by the South African-controlled government. The resulting malnutrition compounds health problems,



Township residents are providing their own social services

and medical services are both inadequate and too expensive for the residents of Katutura, according to the survey.

The very name of the township has a negative connotation. Katutura means "a place where we do not stay." It acquired that name in 1959 when the black population of Windhoek was forced by South Africans to vacate the city. Blacks resisted the move, and the ensuing struggle left 13 dead and 100 injured. Katutura has always been regarded as a place of forced relocation.

The survey, published under the title "Katutura Revisited," also describes several of the community-based organizations (referred to by the acronym CBOs) and self-help schemes that have sprung up over the past two years. A journalist with the community newspaper *Bricks* explained that the "CBOs started precisely because people are desperate, and they have come to the conclusion that none but themselves can free them - especially from the drudgery of daily existence."

Two examples of CBOs are the People's Creche (day care center) and the People's Primary School, both funded by parents in order to provide an English-speaking envi-

ronment for children and to allow parents to have a say in their children's education. Students have formed the Namibia National Students Organization with the aim of establishing a more democratic educational system.

The Katutura Health Committee, a project started by the Council of Churches, concentrates on preventive medicine. It conducts first-aid classes and seminars for residents and confronts authorities about the poor health conditions in the township.

The Legal Aid and Community Advice Bureau assists self-help groups and individuals by helping people draft wills and contracts and by mediating between workers and employers when there is a charge of unfair dismissal. It has also issued pamphlets outlining the rights of citizens who are confronted by the police or threatened with eviction. The bureau is also planning a seminar on workers rights and trade unionism and another regarding women's rights in marriage.

In the final analysis, according to the survey, these groups agreed that what is really needed is "united political action in order to force a change in the political system" in Namibia.

ZAMBIA

Riots Stifle IMF Plan

□ Popular revolts in Zambia's major mining center forced the government to reverse its decision to abolish subsidies for corn meal and may spell trouble for the country's economic recovery program.

The rioting that broke out in mid-December in the country's northern copper mining region was the most violent ever seen in the former British colony. Fifteen persons died, and economic losses caused by the three days of violence were estimated at US\$90 million.


Zambia is one of the few African countries to enjoy political stability, but the recent protests have shaken the government. "We are shocked by what happened," said President Kenneth Kaunda in a national radio broadcast. "This is the worst type of violence that we have seen in our short history as an independent nation."

The price of corn meal had been raised from 37.80 kwachas (US\$3.00) to 82 kwachas (US\$7.00) for a 50-kilogram sack. The move seriously affected working

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people with their low incomes: the annual per capita income was US\$580 in 1985, according to World Bank figures. The decision to increase the price of corn meal was just one element in an austerity program imposed on Zambia by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the condition for a US\$200-million loan for the next two years. Other measures included reductions in public employment, drastic cuts in public spending, and increased participation of the private sector in the country's economy.

DIP/MPLA



Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda

Kaunda admitted that the IMF's conditions were stiff and that the plight of the lower income people had become "hopeless." Their spending power has been "reduced to zero," he said.

He warned, however, that the decision to reverse the price increases for basic foodstuffs means that the government will have to find the resources to continue the subsidy. "I must ask each Zambian to think about the blow he or she has given the nation," said the president. "The consequences will be reflected in the lack of economic development and growth."

However, Grey Zulu, the de facto vice-president and secretary general of the United National Independence Party, attacked the IMF

for imposing the severe conditions. Zulu said that the Fund, which has its headquarters in Washington, causes political revolts in Third World countries and that it has created "untold misery and suffering" in Zambia. The current IMF focus on the foreign debt is causing confusion among debtor countries, added Zulu, who demanded a revision in IMF policies.

Zambian labor leaders, commenting on the price increase, noted that it had reduced the standard of living "to the point of starvation."

Adding to the difficulties was the introduction of a system to determine currency values, which provoked a drastic devalua-

tion of the kwacha. (The current rate of exchange is 12 kwachas to one U.S. dollar.)

The new monetary policy was praised by Zambian business groups which explained that under the system anyone who adjusted to the conditions set forth by the Foreign Exchange Committee of the Central Bank could obtain access to the small amounts of available money.

Prior to the riots, the IMF and other lending institutions had demonstrated their satisfaction with the economic reforms introduced in Zambia and had promised to refinance the country's debt which currently amounts to US\$4.5 billion.

Polling the Occupied

An overwhelming majority of the residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believe that an independent Palestinian state is the only solution to the crisis in the Middle East, according to the most comprehensive public opinion poll ever conducted in the Israeli-occupied territories. The survey, taken at the end of 1986, was performed by an Australian communications network, the North American newspaper *Newsday*,



An Israeli search

and the newspaper *The Jerusalem News*. The team of specialists, who interviewed over 1,000 individuals, was headed by Dr Mohammad Shadid, a political scientist at An Najar

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University in the town of Nablus, on the West Bank.

The survey showed that 77.9 percent of those interviewed believe that nothing less than the creation of a Palestinian state can guarantee a definitive solution to the turmoil that has enveloped the Middle East. Over half said that close family members had suffered maltreatment or were threatened by Israeli occupation forces.

Another interesting finding was the level of support demonstrated by Palestinians for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leader Yasser Arafat. Over 93 percent named the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and 78.8 percent recognized Arafat as their leader. (The leader ranking number two with 5.6 percent was George Habash, who heads the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which has maintained a position of "constructive criticism" of the PLO.)

When asked why they think the Palestinians have resorted to armed struggle, 83 percent responded that "part of the struggle is for the right to self-determination", while 78.4 percent believe that the "violence is justified." While 85.5 percent believe that the U.S.

is not contributing to the peace process, 60.8 percent believe that Washington could play a positive role if it wanted to. At the same time, 59.6 percent believe that the Soviet Union could also help bring peace to the region.

The position of the residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is also clear in relation to the dissension that emerged within the PLO following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. At that time some leaders decided to break with the PLO and Arafat and move to Damascus, Syria. However, 71.2 percent of those in the occupied territories support the "current direction of the PLO" as opposed to just 4.8 percent who identify with the Palestinian groups in Damascus.

Of the 1,000 members of the sample, 29.8 percent live in urban areas, 38.2 percent in villages and 22.0 in refugee camps. The gender breakdown was 56.8 percent male vs. 43.2 percent female. According to workplaces, 61.5 percent work on the West Bank, 31.5 percent in Gaza and five percent in Israel. The educational breakdown was the following: 13.9 percent illiterate, 13.1 percent attended primary school, 29.2 percent attended secondary school, and 18.4 percent attended a university.

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Repression Continues

The Guatemalan Justice and Peace Committee announced that between January and October of 1986 there were 353 verified cases of political assassinations and 142 "detention-disappearances" which "demonstrates that human rights violations continue under the government of President Vinicio Cerezo."

These figures were part of a 108-page report published with the support of the World Council of Churches. It was distributed to the United Nations General Assembly, and an updated report will be presented to the U.N. Human Rights Commission during its sessions in February and March in Geneva, Switzerland.

According to the committee, there was "a deepening of the generalized crisis" in Guatemala in 1986. The report attributes the murders and

disappearances to paramilitary groups, the government security forces and the national police. Only a handful are listed as still "under investigation."

During the nine-month period covered, "no detainee-disappeared person has been found, inefficiencies in the judicial system as a guarantee for fundamental human rights continue to be observed and no one guilty of crimes that imply human rights violations has been detained, processed or sentenced."

the OtherSide

Monthly Journal of Socialist Thought and Action

"the OtherSide is concerned with and is a part of people's struggles in India and elsewhere to create a world free from exploitation, tyranny and war. At the same time it is involved in the search for new ideas to illumine humanity's path towards a more purposeful and rewarding life".

Editor: George Fernandes.

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6/105 Kaushalya Park, Hauz Khas, New Delhi - 110016.

A Nixon Rerun

North Americans have a right to be disappointed with their president. A *Los Angeles Times* poll revealed that 86 percent believe that Ronald Reagan did not tell the truth when he denied sending weapons to Iran in exchange for the U.S. hostages held by Shi'ite Moslems in Lebanon. Another survey, carried out by the Gallup Poll, found that the drop in Reagan's credibility rating was largest since the birth of public opinion polls.

This is a logical reaction. As a candidate, Reagan promised to restore certain principles and values that are dear to U.S. society, especially its most conservative and traditional segments. They included the preservation of public morality, the predominance of private initiative over state interference in the economy, lower taxes, lower inflation and a balanced federal budget. On the international plane, he promised to defend the "free world" and to protect all "legitimate" U.S. interests. Once installed in the White House, however, Reagan seems to have forgotten all of his promises.

During his administration, Reagan's priorities have been strengthening capitalism domestically and U.S. hegemony abroad. Most Americans were unaware of this. They did not know what was happening in Washington.

In a manner reminiscent of the Nixon administration, Reagan stuck with these priorities. Even the methods were the same. Richard Nixon's Watergate differed little

from Reagan's Irangate or Contragate. If a difference exists, it is that once caught red-handed, Nixon admitted his guilt and resigned. Reagan, on the other hand, resorts to new lies and gives no indication that he plans to resign.

Thomas O'Neill, a respected leader of the Democratic Party and the former speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, commented on the president's responsibility in diverting money from the arms deal to support the *contras* in Nicaragua. "I think it was Mr. Reagan's personal decision," said the politician.

While claiming not to be involved in this criminal violation of international law, the president sticks to his old methods. To replace Admiral John Poindexter on the National Security Council (NSC), he appointed another individual who has conspired against constitutionally-elected and progressive governments throughout the world - Mr. Frank Carlucci, who in Brazil, Uruguay, Portugal and South Yemen has always placed himself at the service of the right.

The positive side of Irangate is that it, just like Watergate, is exposing the corrupt methods and practices of a government that, while giving lip service to ethics and democracy, has tried to extend U.S. domination abroad and has proven to be one of the most reactionary in U.S. history - especially with regard to foreign policy. Besides the Nicaraguan *contras*, also benefiting from the profits from the Iranian

arms sales were the right-wing Afghani rebels and the South African-backed UNITA in Angola – according to what we know so far. But there are indications that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the NSC itself have been backing counterrevolutionaries and terrorists the world over.

The admitted involvement of the Israeli government in these disgusting affairs comes as no surprise. More shocking is the participation of Saudi Arabia. To what extent did gunrunner Adnan Kashoggi act on his own, especially given how centralized and secretive the Riyadh government is?

There are other indications that, while the Saudi government cooperated to a certain extent with its neighbor as member of the community of Gulf countries, it was playing along with the U.S. in relation to Iran – which was to be expected.

It is appalling to read the disclosures by the U.S. press on Reagan's position in the Iran-Iraq war. They demonstrate the cruelty of his policy. We already knew that the White House was trying to sit on the fence, but the Iranian arms sales show us where Reagan really stands. We know now that, rather than genuinely supporting Iraq, the "aid" Reagan provided was really "a knife in the country's back," as Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yassin Ransadon put it. As a result of the "intentionally erroneous" military intelligence that the Pentagon conveyed to the Iraqi army general staff, 15,000 Iraqi soldiers died. This is bound to be only a part of the story. We should not be surprised if it turns out that, through such maneuvers and tricks, Reagan was encouraging the Ayatullah Khomeini's intransigence. The Iranian leader has consistently rejected all peace efforts. On the

contrary, he has even used missiles to prolong this irrational war, which runs counter to the interests of both peoples involved, of the Middle East in general, and of all emerging nations.

A recent incident in Brazil illustrates how the Reagan administration conducts its foreign affairs. Four U.S. mercenaries who had been arrested on a ship with an illegal cargo of arms en route to Africa escaped from prison in Brasilia. The four were members of a commando group suspected of being part of an organization intent on destabilizing Ghana's progressive government. Other evidence indicates a different destination – Angola.

Whether the target country was Ghana or Angola, the incident clearly revealed the complicity of the CIA. This complicity was evident in the escape which, according to the Brazilian Federal Police, relied on assistance of U.S. Embassy officials in Brasilia. CIA actions are not the isolated actions taken by "madmen at large": they are part of a government policy.

The Brazilian incident served to illustrate the existence of a nucleus of conspiracy, sabotage, terrorism and arms trafficking in the Reagan administration. Irangate is only the tip of the iceberg. The worst may be yet to come, if the current investigation is actually carried through to its conclusion. The impact of these revelations has been enormous, both in the U.S. and abroad. The U.S. people have begun to see that their country's government is sinking in a quagmire of corruption and that it has nothing to do with their traditions and moral values. Rather, it is oriented in the opposite direction when it includes men who should be in jail and not in the White House. ●

THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE



The cease-fire in the Philippines represents the first step toward a lasting peace on the islands. However, the road to peace may be a long and difficult one.

The guerrillas want a role in the government, while the government offers participation in elections. And in the background, as always, looms the military.

Is a lasting peace possible?

The Philippines

It's hot in Manabo. The sun is burning from on high. The day is going to be a long one. Slowly the men begin to arrive. They sit down, set their guns on the ground and exchange smiles.

A few days ago, they might have been killing each other. Today, they will tell stories of their families, which they will now be able to visit.

Manabo is a village without paved roads and telephone service. It is located in the province of Abra, in a region known as Cordillera, some 600 kilometers north of Manila. It is here that government soldiers and rebel guerrillas are sitting down to share water from their canteens under the shade of the lone tree standing in the schoolyard. They are making Philippine history.

In process are peace negotiations between the government and the Cordillera Popular Liberation Army (CPLA). Colonel León Badival, the provincial commander of the Philippine Armed Forces, is discussing the details of the peace proposal with Father Conrado Balweg, who more than a decade ago traded his rosary for a rifle and today commands the CPLA. With them is a major, a native of a nearby city, who once arrested Balweg's wife. After the meeting, the two share a meal. Later the major declares: "I am the happiest man in the world."

In Cordillera, during the first nine months of 1986, the war took a daily average of five casualties, almost all of them civilian. It is an alarmingly large figure for a region whose population, consisting of 35 indigenous tribes that support the CPLA, stands at about one million.

Sholl Sawadal is clearing the weeds from his yard. His house caught my attention because it is one of the few in Manabo constructed strictly in the traditional manner - with wood and bamboo, without glass and cement. About the peace negotiations, he makes the following comment: "We hope that (President) Cory (Aquino) understands and that peace is on its way."

The day before, Sholl met Father Balweg at

a meeting the former organized with the local population. Sholl said that the guerrilla leader answered 28 questions put to him by the people. Sholl related that he asked what the priest would do if Cory refused to accept autonomy, and that he answered by saying that he would return to the mountains. The people wanted to know if he would continue the guerrilla war, and the CPLA leader declared, according to Sholl: "If the army doesn't attack us, why would we have to respond?"

A people's war

Victor Delgado is a leader of one of the tribes of indigenous people in Cordillera known as the *igorots*. The armistice does not present him with any theoretical problems. "If I could vote for either war or peace, I would vote for peace," he said. "With peace, one can grow old and die in one's own house and build his or her own paradise."

The priest of the Catholic parish of Manabo described the background to the conflict. "There've been years of war and centuries of abuse of our people," said Father Patrick "Pat"



A traditional house in Manabo

Guyugyon. "They never respected our rights to land, to our own culture or to self-determination. More than 80 percent of the forest land in Cordillera was declared public property by the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and handed over to foreign companies. In Abra, a single company received 200,000 hectares of what was communal land. The hydroelectric dam on the Chico River (which wasn't going to benefit the region but rather the larger cities) and the paper processing plant (which is responsible for indiscriminate logging of communal forests) are what instigated the armed struggle in Cordillera."

"It was not only the New People's Army that fought the government," continued Father Pat. "It was the entire people. In 1986 we had the miracle of the revolution in Manila. It was then that the Cordillera Bodong (the tribal congress) told the NPA: 'Thanks, but now we're going it alone.'"

That decision produced a split within the guerrilla ranks. Father Balweg, who is originally from Cordillera, decided to respect the decision of his supporters, and the forces under his command became the CPLA.

On September 13, 1986, an armistice was signed in Cordillera between the government and the CPLA. That agreement was followed by a cease-fire accord between Manila and Moro fighters in the southern part of the country. Now there is an attempt to parley the armistice into a permanent solution. The country is looking to Cordillera in hopes of receiving a signal about its future — and the people of Manobo are looking up into the sky from which a presidential helicopter is descending, in hopes of receiving a response to their desire for peace.

Exuding the charisma that he demonstrated when he was a television host, Cory's assistant and brother-in-law "Butz" Aquino jumps out of the helicopter before its wings come to a halt. He unfurls a copy of today's edition of the newspaper *Malaya*, which announces in a banner headline, "The Chico River Project is Cancelled." Without saying a word, he has broken the ice. The people celebrate while ministers and general negotiate in private with guerrilla commanders and leaders of the recently proclaimed Cordillera nation.



Representatives of the guerrillas and the government

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Army officers dance together with guerrillas in a square dance similar to the Uruguayan "Gato" (although the music is played on gongs), while others from both sides of the conflict pose for pictures taken by the press and by their comrades.

Cory stands firm

In Cordillera, in the northern part of the archipelago and in the Islamic region of Mindanao, the cease-fire could become the basis for a permanent peace agreement and lead to

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regional autonomy. The CPLA is demanding recognition as the "security force" (a type of militarized police force) of an autonomous government. A formula that would imply significant concessions on both sides does not seem to present insuperable difficulties for either — not even for the army, which is as jealous of its prerogatives in the Philippines as are armies the world over.

The dialogue between the government and the New People's Army presents greater difficulties. The NPA is the armed wing of the Communist Party (CP) of the Philippines, which is the largest communist party in southeast Asia and receives no foreign support. The CP has a solid peasant base, is not aligned with either Moscow or Beijing, and acts throughout the Philippines, unlike the Islamic and Cordillera groups which are limited regionally. The NPA has an estimated 20,000 guerrillas in arms — compared with government forces numbering 100,000. And if the CP has learned anything from history, it is to never hand over its weapons.

On the other hand, Cory Aquino's decision to negotiate with the guerrillas almost cost her the presidency. She went ahead with the peace proposal against the explicit wishes of former Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice-President Salvador Laurel, and against the "advice" of the United States.

With the support of General Fidel Ramos, commander in chief of the army, Aquino defeated the attempted coup in November and fired the Defense Minister. At the same time, she notified the NPA that it could either sign a cease-fire agreement immediately or "suffer the consequences."

A night of peace

On December 10, the International Day for Human Rights, popular singers Rebeca Demotilio Abraham and Carina Constantino-David performed for the first time a new song about peace: "The rice fields call out to the

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Soldiers and guerrillas: a chance to relax

peasant/It's time to return to the land." The war is over. That is the general sentiment, although technically there exists only a 60-day cease-fire accord (which is automatically renewable) that will allow for peace negotiations.

In early December, in a luxurious Manila mansion sporting Christmas lights, leftist intellectuals meet for the first time in an informal atmosphere with the representatives of both sides in the negotiations. It is an attempt to contribute to a climate of mutual confidence.

What are the demands of the NPA in its negotiations with the government for a permanent armistice?

"In the first place," responds Saturnino Ocampo, who heads the rebel negotiating team, "the dismantling of the repressive structures of the army. Second, agrarian reform, and third, the elimination of North American military bases from the country."

The CP and its mass organization, the National Democratic Front (NDF), propose the creation of a coalition government in which they would participate — even without having a

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majority.

The government has limited its proposals to something similar to the agreement reached in Colombia in 1984: the guerrillas will be allowed to participate in the political system and in elections. The government would not object if the NPA's arms are stored underground rather than turned over to the government, but it refuses legally to recognize the guerrilla army.

"Agrarian reform and the elimination of the bases are promises that Cory has made," notes the government's chief negotiator, Teophisto "Tito" Guingona. "But national policy will not be on the negotiating table."

Like many of the members of the government negotiating team, Tito Guingona was persecuted during the Marcos dictatorship, and he shared prison cells with many of the NPA representatives. But his position within the administration requires him to display caution.

Will the armed forces respect the cease-fire?

"The military will follow the orders of Commander-in-Chief Corazón Aquino."

And if the talks fail?

"The army has demonstrated for us that there are alternatives..."

To defeat the NPA?

"No, to undertake a large-scale offensive... They appear to be sincere."

Guingona has to convince the military that he is tenaciously defending the interests of the state, while demonstrating to the guerrillas that the Aquino government has control over the military, and that the soldiers will carry out the promises that the president makes.

Since November, when Enrile was frustrated in his attempted coup, cabinet members have



Government negotiator Teophisto "Tito"

been referring to the army as the New Armed Forces — a force that would be professional and apolitical.

One example of the new reality is the reduction of military expenditures from 12 percent to nine percent of government spending — a reduction which was approved prior to the

armistice. Guingona believes that peace will have a positive influence on the behavior of the armed forces. Good faith and common sense will permit them to throw light on the "gray areas" of the cease-fire agreement, where differences in interpretation could produce friction that might spark a resumption of the conflict.

Rebel leader Ocampo guarantees that nobody from his side will boycott the peace agreement. The weekly *Veritas*, which adheres to what is currently the dominant line within the Catholic Church (progressive but not radical, similar to that of Cardinal Jaime Sin, a vital political supporter and spiritual adviser to the president), said that the guerrilla negotiators "are sincere and (that) they have a profound personal commitment" to search for a lasting peace.

The armistice affected the personal lives of many guerrilla leaders. For Tony Zumel it opened up the possibility of a reunion with his 84-year-old mother whom he had not seen since 1965. Ocampo was let out of prison and now is a member of a negotiating team that includes his wife Carolina "Bobbie" Malay, who was able to surface from the underground. His teenager daughter raises funds for the NPA during the meeting by selling buttons. The first-born child is active with the Task Force Detainees. On Christmas Day, 1986, the entire

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family was finally able to gather together for a holiday dinner.

Ocampo believes that the primary obstacle to a lasting peace in the Philippines is the intervention of the United States in domestic politics. He proposes to unite his forces with those of the government to oppose U.S. imperialism, but he is waiting to evaluate the thesis that the army has changed its essential character. In his opinion, this change has yet to take place and the way to ensure it is through a wide-ranging peace agreement that would allow the integration of NPA fighters with government troops.

Even before this comes to pass, the CP is prepared to incorporate itself legally into the political system and the parliamentary process. They note that "it was Marcos who declared us illegal. We didn't go underground because we wanted to but because we had to. But before any agreement is possible, they have to repeal all repressive legislation, free all political prisoners and give us certain guarantees." Rebel leaders are concerned by what has happened in Colombia, where revolutionary leaders were hunted like rabbits when they left the security of the mountains to take up public life in the urban jungle.

General Ramos has admitted that the armed forces cannot militarily defeat the guerrillas, but they can prolong it indefinitely. "The logic of low-level conflict is not to win the war but to win *with* the war," explained a presidential adviser. "That's why Cory has made peace her primary objective. It is a precondition for democracy."

War by other means

North American Ambassador Stephen Bosworth does not share this optimism. "My crystal ball is cloudy on this point" of peace, he told foreign correspondents in Manila two days after the cease-fire agreement took effect. He said that the counterinsurgency effort is a "primary consideration" in determining the

flow of North American aid and that in his judgment the best defense against communism is "a government with credibility, a strong economy and professional military officers."

A successful armistice would be a thorn in the side of the embassy, given that it would contradict the systematic U.S. rejection of similar solutions in Guatemala and El Salvador. For the army, it is obvious that peace is not the opposite of war but the continuation of the latter by other means. Instead of gunpowder, what explodes is a psychological war carried out in the pages of the newspapers and in the streets through the spreading of rumors.

But the guerrillas handle press relations like



The U.S. presence: a major obstacle to peace

fish in a lake – especially if they are allowed to express themselves in Tagalog (the language of the majority of the people and the only one that the poor really speak well) instead of English (the language traditionally employed in parliamentary politics).

The "gray areas" that concern government negotiator Guingona can only be cleared up through a bona fide effort. Technically, the guerrillas are armed bandits, and membership in the CP is still a crime in the Philippines. With the exception of those who expressly received amnesty from Aquino, no Marxist-Leninist

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can walk freely in the streets. Zumel and Ocampo needed special safe-conduct passes to come down from the mountains to participate in the peace talks.

The armistice may be a preview to the ending of all "hostile acts," but it does not establish areas of operation for the respective armies. Two days before the cease fire began, Colonel Honesto Isleta, a spokesperson for the armed forces, announced that the army would continue patrolling the "entire country," including the areas under NPA control. He added that current law requires the military to disarm "any person who is carrying a weapon without the required permit." Obviously, the guerrillas have no such permission, and Ocampo was adamant in pointing out that any attempt to disarm an NPA soldier would be resisted and would be considered a "hostile act." According to the cease-fire agreement, he noted, both army and NPA patrols must carry flags that indicate their lack of hostile intent. If the army wants to chase down criminals, he added, the guerrillas will cooperate fully. In the opinion of a spokesperson for the National Democratic Front, Isleta's statement can only be designed to encourage a boycott of the armistice.

"There won't be any more military spokespersons," promised María Diokno, a member of the government negotiating team. "Everything relating to the discussions will be announced by the armistice committee, which will be named by the agreement of both parties."

Later, however, General Ramos himself spoke out strongly on the issue of patrols, in support of Isleta's position. If this verbal war had continued, the truce might not have gone into effect December 10. Guerrilla spokespersons elected not to respond and instead to wait and see what would happen. The 10th of December passed, and so did the 11th, and no incidents were reported.

On December 12, the NDF organized a public display of force in a small rural village. One hundred armed guerrillas gathered

together, and it was the army that protested. The armistice committee resolved that the rebels could not again make such ostentatious displays in populated areas. The gray area was reduced but not eliminated. The term "populated area" will have to be defined or else the army will be able to use this clause to impede guerrillas in transit.

Word of honor

What is notable is not that differences of interpretation exist or that the parties try to take advantage of them, but that peace continues. Nobody wants to appear against peace publicly, but the interests at stake are large — for example, the army will see its role in Philippine society reduced if peace is consolidated.

In addition, there exist other forces that are difficult to control, such as the private armies of large landowners, the soldiers still faithful to ousted Defense Minister Enrile and common criminals who pose as guerrillas and demand "revolutionary taxes" from the population.

Guingona and Ocampo agree that a climate of trust must be established, and they promise that neither side will interrupt the peace talks or the cease-fire — unless someone acts against the wishes of the respective leaderships. "Those who violate the agreement will be punished," Ocampo promised, speaking for the rebels.

— And the army?

— Those who commit infractions will be punished, said Diokno.

— By being forced to do 30 push-ups?

— No. The punishment will be proportional to the infraction and will satisfy the Supervisory Commission for the Armistice. Word of honor.

First the institutions

Silencing the weapons was not easy, but reaching a lasting peace will be doubly difficult. The February Revolution took place in Manila,



Roberto Fierno

Demonstrators in downtown Manila: vote "yes" on the constitution

where the middle class objected to the murder of Ninoy Aquino upon his return from exile in 1984 and the fraud that was designed to rob an electoral victory from his widow Corazón. But those who opposed the dictatorship when it was strongest were the guerrillas in the mountains. They knew the Marcos regime well enough to have predicted cheating in the elections, but they underestimated the capacity of the people to defend the results. The NPA, which had called for a boycott of the elections, lacked the moral authority to defend its results and therefore remained apart from the mobilizations that overthrew the dictatorship against which they had been fighting.

From the rebel point of view, it is only obvious that they should participate in a coalition government, given their long struggle for democracy. However, civilians and military officers on the right and the majority of the liberals in the government believe this perspective to be ridiculous. The guerrillas should contest elections if they want to take power, they say. The fish should get out of the water and fight on the asphalt.

The government has announced that the negotiations will be limited to the discussion of the peace proposal – that is, how to put an end to armed conflict – without entering into a debate over policy or program. It is widely speculated in Manila that Cory will not be able to remain in office if she appears to be

“capitulating” to the communists.

On the other hand, no matter how much good faith the rebels display, nobody will be able to convince them to turn over their weapons and transform their soldiers into adjuncts of the armed forces without guarantees that the military will defend democracy and popular advances. What is likely is that the negotiations will be prolonged for months, while the good intentions of the participants are tested and the government has an opportunity to follow through on its promises of agrarian reform, democratization and an independent foreign policy – all of which are guerrilla prerequisites to peace.

The problem is that politics in the Philippines is moving faster on institutionalization than on reform. A plebiscite on the new constitution is taking place in February, and in May there will be parliamentary elections.

A broadly based Coalition for Constitutional Approval (CCA) is leading a campaign for “yes” votes in the plebiscite. It inaugurated its campaign in early December with a rally in Rizal Park in downtown Manila. In the same park where hundreds of thousands of demonstrators once gathered to demand an end to the Marcos dictatorship, pro-constitution organizers were unable to bring together even 10,000 – and most of those who showed up were public employees of the City of Manila, a megalopolis with a population of over five

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million.

A youth leader exalted the virtues of the new constitution, which would be the most advanced in Philippine history. It stipulates that the state is obligated to promote social justice, guarantees equal rights for women, outlines procedures for the expropriation of land which will make possible agrarian reform, declares the nation a nuclear-free zone and requires special ratification by the Senate for the continuation of U.S. military bases on the islands after 1991. Later, a Christian Democratic leader took the microphone: "Two things are important in the new constitution," he said. "First, there will be an independent legislature; second, it will establish a six-year mandate for Cory and Laurel. Everything else can be amended..." The emphasis placed on the figure of Vice-President Laurel, who adopted an ambiguous attitude in the days preceding the attempted coup and who is openly pro-U.S., identified the speaker as a member of the "civilized right." His reference to the potential for constitutional amendments demonstrates the strategy of the right. Just like during the April 1975 Revolution in Portugal, conservatives are

swearing to defend a proposed constitution - only to gut it when they have the chance.

The campaign for a "no" vote is being headed by those still faithful to former dictator Marcos, and it is destined for a resounding defeat. The only advantage that the "no" forces have, according to analysts, is the general apathy toward the plebiscite, which has a predictable result. While Cory is making an effort to win a decisive victory and thus a vote of confidence, her supporters are more interested in the legislative race.

Positions taken by the Marxist left vary between the critical support of the People's Party to stances favoring abstention or even a "no" vote should fears of a shift to the right in the cabinet be realized.

The Marxist-Leninist left counts on a mature popular army, and a workers organization (the First of May Movement) that mobilized hundreds of thousands for the funeral of its leader Rolando Olalia - who was murdered November 12 by a death squad. In addition, it has a legal political party experienced in the nuances of urban politics.

The traditional pattern of large

Moros: complete autonomy

An agreement on the "complete autonomy" of Muslim areas of the Philippines was reached between Nur Misuari, the leader of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and a representative of the government of Corazón Aquino after three days of talks in early January. The discussions were held under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in its Jeddah, Saudi Arabia headquarters.

Heralded by the MNLF as "a victory for both Christians and Muslims," the agreement was nevertheless questioned by

armed groups in the region. Both the Bangsa Moro Islamic Party (BMIP) and the Moro Independent Liberation Front (MILF), which split with the MNLF in 1977, refused to approve the accord because they had been excluded from the negotiations.

For centuries, the Moros resisted Spanish colonization, and they later battled North American domination and the Ferdinand Marcos regime. The Aquino government had elected to use the new constitution as a framework for negotiations with armed guerrilla groups, but this collided with the aspirations of pro-independence Moro groups, which consider the status of regional autonomy insufficient.

landownership, together with the invasion of lands by transnational fruit exporting companies, is heightening tensions in the countryside and increasing demographic pressure on overcrowded cities. The drop in the price of sugar and other primary Philippine exports and the external debt refinancing costs are leading to increased poverty among the majority of the 50 million Filipinos. Their demands for reform are taking on a tone of urgency.

The right is divided between those who are faithful to the old regime, reinforced now by the return of Enrile and his followers, and the political conservatives who support the Aquino government. Potential threats include the desire of the U.S. to maintain its bases, large landowners jealous of their privileges, the resistance of the military to a change in its role, and dictators and puppet democrats in the region who are concerned about the creation of a model that might be adapted in their own countries.

Between the left and the right, politicians like Butz Aquino propose "the construction of a center force" that would consist not only of the middle class (an estimated nine percent of the population) but also of the silent majority who favor peace and moderation. It is likely that this group would have the blessing of the church hierarchy. This center force, capable of averting a collision between the other two, would be impossible without the charismatic figure of Corazón Aquino.

At the first cabinet meeting following the signing of the armistice and the defeat of the Enrile conspiracy, Cory asked Jovy Balonga of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (charged with combating corruption) to lead the ministers in prayer. "All powerful Lord," said Balonga, "we thank you for the gift of life. It allows us to serve you, our country and our people — especially the weak, the poor and the dispossessed." Little could be added but the "Amen" of the Philippine people. ●

Roberto Remo Bissio

One Coup Down: More to Go?

The military which stood by President Aquino in November has not been reformed. Will it remain loyal?

President Corazón Aquino barely survived a coup d'état code-named "God Save the Queen." But it was not God who saved the Queen. She was saved by General Fidel Ramos, head of the same military organization to which the conspirators belonged.

Events this year have drawn attention to a new phenomenon in Philippine politics: soldiers who cannot be comfortable in the barracks, having had a taste of power and publicity. In February 1986 this politicized soldiery drove the last nails on Ferdinand Marco's political coffin. In late November 1986 it reared its head again, this time to try to topple the democratic government of Cory Aquino.

The heroes of February became the villains of November. But there may be more Novembers in the coming months. Since Marcos declared martial law, the Philippines has become a typical Third World nation where the threat of a coup is a fact of life. Once the army is politicized, it cannot be depoliticized. Beneath its machine-like appearance, the army is still a human institution; it has a memory that cannot be erased like the random access memory of a computer. The principle of civilian supremacy can be written on every page of our constitution, but this in itself will not preclude a military takeover; after all, a coup d'état is by definition an extra-constitutional means of deposing a government.

What the pious call "the EDSA miracle" — the revolution of people's power — was an

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unfinished insurrection and an unfinished coup d'etat. The country, if you recall, was at the verge of insurrection.

After Marcos cheated brazenly in the February elections, Cory's plea for "active non-violent civil disobedience" prepared the ground. But the process was only starting to gain momentum when all of a sudden Minister Juan Ponce-Enrile and General Ramos staged the mutiny of February 22.

In his original announcement, Enrile made it appear that the mutiny was a spontaneous response to Marcos's order for their arrest.



February 1986: the fall of Marcos

Now it is known that it was not all that spontaneous. The RAMBoys, with his encouragement and advice, plotted a *coup* against Marcos. Their plans were ready by September 1985 and it was supposed to be implemented on Christmas or New Year's eve. They held it in abeyance when Marcos called for snap elections.

Enrile and his RAMBoys resurrected the coup plans immediately after the elections, but these plans were discovered by General Fabian Ver before they could be put into effect. The arrest on February 21 of the RAM striking

force that was tasked with capturing Marcos and his family, caused Enrile and his RAMBoys to panic. They had to stage the mutiny on February 22, realizing that a delay could be fatal.

Thus, the plan for a coup was replaced with an unplanned mutiny. There is a whole of a difference between the two. A coup d'etat is an offensive strategy, a mutiny is defensive. Hence, the goal of capturing Malacanang gave way to the suicidal idea of staking out in Camps Crame and Aguinaldo. Even with Ramos as a last minute recruit, the mutineers could not pack sufficient strength to cancel out the overwhelming superiority of the loyalist forces in Metro-Manila.

Only then did people's power become a crucial factor. Hundreds of thousands of people shielded Camp Crame, thus establishing what is known in military jargon as "defense in depth." This simply means keeping your enemy at a distance while you cannot destroy him. Ordinarily, a defense in depth is achieved by artillery barrage, but because the mutineers in Crame lacked artillery, they relied on an ocean of people to keep the loyalists at a safe distance.

The presence of the people also contributed a great deal to demoralizing the loyalist troops and urging them to defect in large numbers, until the balance of forces shifted decisively against Marcos by noon of February 24. On the other hand, the presence of the people prevented the mutiny from escalating into a *coup* when the balance of forces changed. Had Enrile marched his troops to Malacanang to seize power for himself, the people who protected him could have turned into his executioners. The people were there not for love of Enrile but to enforce Cory's victory.

The abortion of the *coup* also forced Enrile to lower his ambition. Had he successfully staged a *coup*, he would have established a military-civilian junta with himself as the strong man. His second option was a coalition government with himself, Ramos, Doy Laurel and Cory Aquino as co-equal partners. The

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proclamation of Cory as president was only the third option. Because events unfolded in such a way that people's power emerged as the decisive factor, Enrile agreed to the third option: proclaim Cory and Doy.

At that time he never mentioned his notion of a coalition government. Had he told the people, they might have left him to the tender mercies of General Ver or lynched him ourselves. He pledged allegiance to Cory as the duly elected president. It was only recently that he started talking of a coalition government, claiming co-equal status with Cory in constituting the cabinet.

Despite this half-forgotten agreement, however, Cory started ruling like a proper president instead of behaving as Enrile's flunkey. She appointed ministers Enrile did not like. She ignored his recommendees for cabinet appointment and again ignored his advice to retain the 1973 constitution. Enrile had a host of grievances which led him to reactivate the plan for a *coup*, but this time against a popular president.

In other words, while the people are trying to finish the unfinished democratic revolution, Enrile and his RAMboys wanted their unfinished *coup*!

The prospects of a coup

Enrile's plot was doomed from the start because his RAMboys were all very talkative. Journalists, foreign and local, who flocked to the Defense Ministry building were fed a daily diet of "confidential information" on how these gallant soldiers would turn the lady president into a figurehead, and how, if she remained obstinate, they would bump her off the throne to give way to the Ibanag Cromwell.

But these garrulous plotters grossly misjudged Cory's nerves. They thought the "psywar" tactics they learned from their North American mentors in Fort Bragg would pressure her to give in to Enrile's demands. Most important was the demand to go back to the 1973 constitution and reconvene the Batasang Pambansa. Since her followers constituted a small minority in the Batasan, Cory would have become hostage to the cluster of *balimbings* around Enrile. She would then be as powerless as the Queen of England.

The RAMboys were also guilty of what is known in *coup d'etat* jargon as "overrecruitment." One of the conspirators revealed the details of "Project God Save the Queen" to General Ramos and President



Reuters

A pro-Aquino demonstration: the people swept her to power

Cover Story

Aquino. That removed the element of surprise.

Enrile's oversized security group under Colonel Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan plus the Anti-Terrorist Unit of Colonel Red Kapunan were reinforced by troops from Region 2 (especially Cagayan and Isabela) and a battalion from Tarlac. These would have sufficed if their enemy were only the presidential security group. But against General Montano's COM, General de Villa's SAF and General Rodolfo Canieso's PAC who were loyal to General Ramos, they could have been crushed. But they misjudged Ramos as well. Even if he was opposed to a *coup*, they thought he would always give the highest value to the unity of the armed forces. They thought they could either win him to their side, or at least keep him neutral. They did not reckon with the active opposition of Ramos until the early morning of Sunday.

Enrile was very close to grabbing power. Cory had only a few combat-effective units loyal to her aside from the Presidential Security Group of Colonel Voltaire Gazmin.

General Ramos thus became the crucial factor. Had Ramos joined Enrile, Cory's government would have collapsed as quickly as the Marcos dictatorship which was rotten to the core. That would have been what the Spaniards call *pronunciamiento*, a specific type of a *coup d'etat* which involves the entire armed forces, not just a faction of it; when the military would act like a trade union on strike, and even if Ramos decided not to join, provided he remained neutral, the RAMBoys could have subdued the defenders of Malacanang.

The RAMBoys had an idea of how to prevent the mobilization of people's power. Since President Aquino did nothing to organize her spontaneous support into community-based people's councils, as she promised soon after assuming office, there was no way to respond to a *coup* quickly and decisively to abort it. What happened in February is difficult to replicate, perhaps even impossible to replicate considering that the RAMBoys are not as stupid

as Ver, and they had drawn lessons from Ver's failure. If the armed forces were unified, or if the RAMBoys alone were ready but the rest remained neutral, they could have captured Malacanang in an hour at the most, and presented the people with a *fait accompli*.

The social democratic organizations which provided the critical mass in February seem to have degenerated as their leaders are now preoccupied with bureaucratic work and backroom politicking. Their mass organizations have not shown significant mobilizing power. In the last few occasions they have relied only on the traditional *hakot* system involving government employees. Such mode of mobilization is good only for parades and similar spectacles, not for confronting a *coup*.

We cannot afford to be complacent. Just because Enrile is out does not mean democracy is safe. There has to be a thorough revamping of the armed forces, not to depoliticize it (a futile project) but to imbue it with a commitment to democratic politics. President Aquino, in starting afresh, should go beyond changing her cabinet; she has to overhaul the entire bureaucracy so that people may have confidence in her subordinates as they have confidence in her.

Finally, she has to provide a structure to people's power so as to facilitate mobilization, not only against future coups but also against the corruption, inefficiency and insensitivity of bureaucrats. Unless sweeping changes are instituted in the armed forces, in the government, and in society at large, the threat of a *coup* will always be with us. As her charisma wanes while the people's enthusiasm turns into cynicism, another self-declared man of destiny will come forward, himself claiming the mission of snatching the republic at the brink of disaster.

Dr. Francisco Nemenzo*

* Dr. Nemenzo is a professor of political science at the University of the Philippines. This article was adapted from a story which appeared in the Philippine Tribune.

Indigenous Self-government

The indigenous people of Cordillera have proclaimed their desire for regional autonomy. They plan to govern themselves using traditional methods.



Roberto Remo

Representatives at the Peace Congress. The result: a Bodong, a general agreement

At a schoolyard in the village of Manabo in the Philippine province of Abra, delegates representing 35 tribes gathered last December 3 in a makeshift bamboo tent to proclaim the birth of the "Cordilleran" nation as part of the Republic of the Philippines.

The Peace Congress, attended by approximately 500 representatives, approved a document linking their tribes to a general agreement (known as a Bodong). It also demanded recognition by the Manila Government of Cordillera as an autonomous region. Among the delegates were women and elderly members of tribal councils. Their meeting was held under the protection of the Cordilleran People's Liberation Army (CPLA),

which the congress named as the area's "security force".

Cordillera is a mountainous area in the northern Philippines with a long tradition of struggle against both the Spanish and North American varieties of colonialism. Historically neglected by the development process, Cordillerans have in recent years opposed two "development" projects – a paper-making plant that would devastate communal forests, and a hydroelectric plant that would flood their lands for the benefit of "non-Cordilleran" cities and peoples.

Political theorists have long debated the problem of ethnic minorities and their relation to nation-states, as well as the issue of social

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and political organization. CPLA commander Father Conrado Balweg approached both issues from the concrete reality of Cordillera and found an answer in the traditional institution of *Bodong*.

Bodong means literally "to shake hands" and applies to the peace treaties through which two or more "Cordilleran" tribes solve their conflicts, divide hunting grounds or agree to share drinking water; it also prescribes punishment for those members of a tribe who commit crimes against another.

"Essentially," explained Balweg, "*Bodong*" is a declaration of self-government. It says that the self-governing members of a society wish to relate with other societies. More than a mere agreement between tribes, *Bodong* is an assembly of the people that will decide who will be the warrantors of a peace treaty. There is no *Bodong* without warrantors, and these are elected by the people in a bottom-to-top process."

In 1982, five Kalinga tribes entered into a *Bodong* to oppose a hydroelectric plant project on Chico River which would have flooded their prime agricultural lands without making any contribution to the well-being of the local population: the energy to be produced was to be consumed in large urban areas. Since then, other tribes have been incorporated, and their organization is now known as the Cordillera *Bodong* Association (CBA). Its constitution was written in 1983 with the participation of 32 delegates from a total eleven tribes.

By 1984 the number of delegates had increased to 50. Their 1986 meeting was attended not only by delegates of the area's 35 tribes, but also by representatives from "detrribalized" urban areas that boast "modern" political structures.

A new pact adding more representatives now demands much more than Manila intends to offer: Cordillera proclaims itself a nation and, short of independence, demands basic

rights as an autonomous region.

"Land, self-government and culture have been the basic goals of our struggle ever since the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines," says Father Pat Guyguyon, the parish priest of Manabo. "We first assert ourselves in our own eyes by proclaiming our condition as *igorots* (indigenous people). Only then can we become part of the Philippine Republic. And we are glad that the Muslims are doing the same."

Peace as the government's initiative

According to Father Balweg, the pact is a historical event in Cordillera. "It announces the birth of the Cordilleran nation as the culmination of a process of self-determination which took the most democratic form possible, on the basis of our people's own institutions and customs that reflect our history and achievements."

Do you believe Manila will accept all your demands - self-government, traditional institutions, communal property and an army of your own?

- When we began our struggle, we never thought it would be short.

What about non-tribal areas and peoples with a western perspective?

- *Bodong* means self-government. Even where the term is not used, there exist other forms of self-government and the desire for democratic rule.

Of course this original process has its critics, not only among those in the area who remain loyal to the New People's Army, but also among those largely conservative people who prefer "modern" urban political methods. They question the legitimacy of *Bodong* as a form of government, arguing that it is no more than an agreement between tribes.

"We prefer the *Bodong* method," said one CBA leader. "And we plan to govern under a pact. Our political institutions may seem outdated, but we can adapt them to new situations. This is what we have been trying to

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say ever since the Spaniards first arrived here, but no one would listen to us."

A woman energetically remarked that "We had a so-called government that was killing our people. How can the *Bodong* not be the government? It has brought us peace. It is the will of the people."

The Constitution

"We, the warrantors of the peace treaty, the elders and other leaders of the tribes of the Cordilleran people, having begged *nian's* enlightenment and called upon the *aritos* as our witnesses, have met to establish a great *Bodong* among all tribes... that are hereby united... and pledge to guarantee this historical alliance. Both we and our descendants hereby proclaim, in the name of the peoples in this confederation, a *Paqta of the Bodong Cordillera* as our common and fundamental law."

The first article of the preamble of the Constitution of Cordillera introduces the concept of nationality by defining the Bodong Cordillera as "the national community of the various tribes and peoples belonging to the Cordilleran civilization and culture." The Bodong stresses the importance of the villages (*lilis*) as "basic political units," together with "all indigenous self-governing institutions at the village level, such as the council of elders, the village assembly, the men's meetings (*ators*), etc." Wherever these traditional institutions no longer exist, modern political institutions are to be adopted.

Article IV defines Cordillera as a confederation that allows for federations made up of various ethnic-linguistic groups: the *kalinga*, *kankanney* and *ibaloi*, as well as the *tinggiao* and *tinggian* majorities which may opt to create one or more federations.

Article V establishes that Cordillera is part of the Philippines, on a par with the Bangsa-Moro people (southern Muslims) and proposes a federal structure for the Philippine Republic.



Father Balweg

Article VII establishes that "no policies shall be adopted that run counter to the indigenous socialist culture or the autonomy of the various peoples of Cordillera," and that the government emerging from this constitution "shall reflect the traditional practice of direct democracy and collective leadership." Legislative powers are ascribed to a congress made up of the *Bodong* warrantors, the elders at the village level, and tribal delegates, who shall elect an executive council, whose president will head the Judiciary Power, represented at the summit by the Supreme Court of Cordillera.

The congress shall command the CPLA through a National Defense Council presided over by the Commander-in-Chief, Father Balweg.

Article XVII deals with the CPLA, proclaiming it as an extension of village security forces consisting of *maingels* (tribal warriors) or soldiers who have been "specially trained to defend their country and their people."

Article XVIII sets forth that the "traditional decision-making methods of discussion, consultation and consensus shall be used in elections, instead of the modern mechanism of competition between opponents, which promotes fraud and disunity in the community." Wherever modern election methods are adopted, such as secret voting and lists of candidates, they "are not to run counter to the consensus process in collective decisions." ●

(R.R.B.)

The Battle of the Bases

The lease does not expire until 1991, but Filipinos are already debating whether to allow the United States to continue operating military bases on their territory.



Striking workers camped out in front of the telephone company

Under the shade of an unfurled parachute, a group of men and women stand guard before the building of the Evangelista Telephone Company in the city of Angeles. Instead of occupying the company's facilities, they have laid siege to the building in an effort to starve out the few loyal employees still on the job. Anyone attempting to come out to get food is not allowed to return. Amapola Lacson, the leader of the 64 striking workers, says that "The strike is actually over," which explains why they are no longer displaying their picket

signs. Yet the siege continues because the company's managers have refused to comply with a court order to rehire dismissed union workers.

The conflict is illustrative of what has been going on in the Philippines since the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos in February 1986. On September 1, immediately after purchasing the Angeles telephone company, located near the United States Clark Air Force Base, a Chinese businessman fired several union leaders without cause. A labor court ruled in favor of the

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workers, but the decision has yet to be implemented. So the workers went on strike.


The Chinese business community is powerful in the Philippines. Its members avoid meddling in politics and try to keep a low profile to avoid exacerbating ethnic conflicts, but these golden rules were violated by Evangelista's new owner, who made arrogant statements on television and publicly challenged the labor minister. The businessman's personal bodyguards attempted to intimidate striking workers with their weapons, and company management tried to send in food for the strikebreakers by using uniformed police on an alleged "inspection visit." The maneuver was frustrated by a female worker who thought the policemen looked a bit overweight; actually they were carrying food under their uniforms.

In the negotiations sponsored by the Labor Ministry, the new owner repeatedly tried to stall the proceedings by claiming that he had to "consult his superiors." A subsequent investigation by the union revealed that the company's real owner was Estelito Mendoza, a former justice minister and one of Marcos' most active supporters.

Because of its proximity to the U.S. air base, Angeles is a critical link in the country's communications network. Marcos loyalists probably targeted communications centers, and the transfer of the company's ownership may have been part of the "God Save the Queen" operation which was slated for November under the command of General Juan Ponce Enrile. Despite the threat of a strike, the firing of the union leaders was necessary to ensure control of the telephone company by Marcos loyalists when the coup was attempted.

The coup failed, but part of the price paid by President Cory Aquino to win the support of General Fidel Ramos was to yield to the military's "respectful request" that four cabinet ministers be dismissed. Among them was Labor Minister Augusto Sánchez, who the military believed to be too lenient towards workers.

Under the parachute, the telephone workers



PACE President César Reyes

await the enforcement of the court decision. Meanwhile, Lacson says, they have the support of their labor union, which supplies them with food, in addition to the aid of the youth organization "New Ideas," progressive Christians, and other labor unions.

"Many things have changed in this country," notes a veteran militant who makes a material contribution to the striking workers. "In the past, I would never have dreamed of contributing to a labor union affiliated with the TUCP (the Trade Union Council of the Philippines, which is linked to the U.S. AFL-CIO, and which has been criticized by the leaders of the more combative *Kilusang Mayo Uno* workers central for favoring management). But these women have placed themselves at the head of a movement to prevent Marcos from staging a comeback. If the coup can be stopped here, only 300 meters from the base, it doesn't matter which labor union in Manila the workers decide to support."

César Reyes, president of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association (PACE) to which the Clark air base employees belong, could be called a pro-management labor leader. Yet it was his union that challenged the entire U.S. policy in the Philippines by going on strike in March 1986. The dispute was over economic

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demands and working conditions: it was not political. However it made such an impression on public opinion during the first weeks of the Aquino government that labor issues have since remained prominent in all political discussions.

Reye's position is clear. "We are not hypocrites," he says. "We live off the bases, and we don't want them to leave the country."

The PACE membership encompasses 5,400 of the 6,100 civilian employees working for the U.S. Air Force at Clark. In addition, another 14,000 Filipinos work inside the base but are employed by local firms which are subcontracted to provide maintenance, construction, janitorial and other services. Filipinos usually hold low-level positions as drivers, typists, janitors and fire fighters, but there are also Philippine architects, lawyers and psychologists.

Reyes is proud of this fact and does not believe that the escalation in the drug traffic, crime and prostitution in Angeles poses a serious problem. "You will find prostitutes in cities that are far away from the bases," he says. He insists that the March labor strike was not political: "There was a labor strike in 1971 under Marcos, too." And he sees "no difference" between the previous government and the Aquino administration, although he concedes that "we have more freedom now."


— Is there any indication that the Americans are getting ready to leave the Philippines?

"Well, they say they will not stay here if they are not welcome, but they have been building new runways and additional quarters. So it seems that more of them will be arriving soon."

Area: 300,000 sq. km. — The Philippines consist of 7,000 islands, although eleven account for 94 percent of the total area
Population: 53,350,000

The Clark Air Force base extends over 45,000 hectares of Philippine territory, with an additional 20,000 hectares utilized for target practice. The base was inaugurated in 1902 as Fort Stotenburg and was renamed following World War II. It is now the largest U.S. Air Force facility abroad. The U.S. and Philippine flags grace the main entrance; officially, Clark is only a "U.S. facility in a Philippine base." Philippine soldiers guard the gate (their only practical function there), but all restricted areas are subjected to a double or triple check by U.S. security personnel.

Filipinos working at the base agree to let me make a tour of the facilities and manage to get me inside using a trick that I promised not to reveal. With the exception of the constant noise of planes landing and taking off, the base seems



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very much like an average North American city with supermarkets, cafeterias, four schools and tennis courts. Many of the cars parked around the base have U.S. license plates. But anyone who tries to use a telephone will notice the difference: "Warning: this phone may be tapped. Passing information about the base is a misdemeanor. Be careful of what you say."

The feeling of being watched infects my escorts, who ask me not to use my camera so liberally. We are at the core of the most powerful military facility in the Far East. The deafening roar of a group of fighters overhead stresses their admonition.

Recently declassified U.S. documents dating from 1945 describe Clark and Subic Bay, the other U.S. base in the Philippines, as "jumping boards" into the Far East. The U.S. troops that helped extinguish the Boxers' nationalist uprising in China in 1900, as well as the marines who were dispatched to Siberia during the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, left from there. Both bases were also instrumental in the U.S. intervention in Korea in the 1950s and in the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s. Philippine independence has gone unnoticed in Clark and Subic Bay, which in the 1980s continue to be a major stronghold for U.S. military troops deployed around the Indian Ocean - one-half million troops who constitute a force that can be quickly dispatched to any part of Asia or the Middle East.

Although the new Philippine constitution prohibits the development and use of nuclear weapons, Gene LaRocque, an admiral in the U.S. Naval Reserves, recently informed the U.S. Congress that Subic Bay is being used as a base for nuclear submarines and warships and that bombers carrying nuclear weapons operate out of Clark. The underground ammunition depot there, which is supposedly immune to a nuclear attack, is a storage area for nuclear weapons and sophisticated telecommunications equipment.

Owen Wilkers, a New Zealand nuclear weapons specialist, argues that these advance

Roberto Remo




Angeles Vice-mayor Tony Abad Santos (center)

bases will allow the U.S. to strike first in the event of a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. And as long as this advantage can be preserved, Washington is unlikely to engage in serious disarmament talks in Moscow.

Daniel B. Schirmer, a specialist in U.S.-Philippine relations, attacked the argument that the bases are necessary to offset Soviet access to military facilities in Cam Rahn Bay, Vietnam, less than 1,000 kilometers from Clark. "This is a curious line of thought," he said. "The U.S. installed its bases in the Philippines several decades before the Soviets began using that port. Yet their presence in Cam Rahn is now used as a pretext for keeping the bases in the Philippines. It would be more realistic to assume that the Soviets sought access to the Vietnamese facilities within the context of the Cold War, in response to the U.S. bases in the Philippines, and to support the solution proposed by the Anti-Base Coalition in the archipelago, which requires the withdrawal of all foreign bases in the western Pacific."

In addition to Clark and Subic Bay (home of a U.S. Naval shipyard), military bases include Camp O'Donnel (a communications unit equipped with giant microwave antennas), the U.S. Navy's San Miguel Air Station, the Wallace Air Station, and the John Hay Air Station. The latter has been converted into a



Hangars at the U.S. Clark Air Force Base

leisure center. The existence of a secret base in Mindanao and of a large Voice of America retransmission center in Tarlac is the object of much speculation in Angeles.

The existing agreements on the installations expire in 1991, when the U.S. is expected to withdraw its bases — unless a new lease is signed. In late 1984, several prominent Philippine politicians signed a document stating that the U.S. presence should not be allowed to extend beyond 1991 because the bases violate Philippine sovereignty and expose the country to attacks by other major powers.

Among the signatories of the document were current President Corazón Aquino, Minister of Agriculture and Food Policy Ramón Mitra, presidential advisers Aquilino Pimentel and "Butz" Aquino, and Teofisto Guingona, who heads the government team that has been negotiating with the guerrillas. Conspicuously abstaining from signing the document was current Vice-President Salvador "Doy" Laurel, the leader of the right-wing within the Aquino administration.

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"Any politician who opposes the bases won't stand a chance in this town," says Angeles Vice - Mayor Tony A. Abdad Santos. According to him, roughly 70 percent of the local population of 250,000 is economically dependent on the Clark base. In turn, the base is far from being self-sufficient. In addition to the Filipino manpower that keeps it running, the base relies on local electric power and food supplies.

"The left is afraid of a nuclear war," says Santos, a member of the Popular Democratic Party (PDP-Labam) which is presided over by the president's brother, José "Peping" Cojuangco. "I sympathize with them. But we have to be realistic. If the Cubans haven't so far succeeded in getting the marines out of Guantanamo, what can we expect to achieve here?"

A self-proclaimed center-leftist, Santos says he is an ardent nationalist, and takes pride in the fact that his grandfather Pedro Abad Santos was one of the founders of the Philippine Socialist Party and a first-secretary to the

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Communist Party. In the coming elections, he will probably have the support of the left when he challenges Mayor Francisco Nepomuceno, a man with connections in the business community and in the training centers that surround the base. His platform includes improving education and the creation of a center for the treatment of drug addicts. In his opinion, the rent paid by the U.S. for use of the bases (US\$ 100 million annually) should be increased. He would also like to attract new investments "because, if all of a sudden the Americans decide that they no longer need the bases, they will close them and leave, no matter how much we beg them to stay."

Irineo "Song" Alvaro would also like to see additional investments in Angeles as an alternative to the bases. He entertained this idea even before the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, when the only youth organization allowed to exist was the Chess Center, where he acted as a secretary. The club's chess players turned it into a meeting place for political discussion. One of the favorite themes for debate was why the closing of the bases was not a popular struggle, given that the Filipinos were so nationalistic and since Angeles had been a hotbed of leftist militancy since the turn of the century (probably because of its daily contact with "the gringos"). He arrived at the conclusion that the masses do not usually bite the hand that feeds them. "If there were any feasible alternatives, Filipinos would choose them rather than prostituting themselves," says Alvaro.


During the civil disobedience campaign against the Marcos dictatorship, the Angeles chess players came together once again in the "Novus Scopes" (New Perspectives) movement, which is now affiliated to the Bisig socialist confederation, in an attempt to find new solutions for old problems. Should the North Americans leave the country, they argue, thousands of hectares of land would be available for cultivation, the base's air terminals could offer an alternative to the congestion at Manila's International Airport, and the officers'

bungalows could house tourists, a university campus or simply be used to improve the housing conditions of the residents of Angeles.

In the "red light district"

Mabelle Varona is one of the 18,000 prostitutes who, according to the euphemism used by the U.S. Air Force, "entertain" military personnel stationed at Clark. Her story is commonplace: poverty and war chased her from her rural hometown. Her dream is no different from that of all the others - to marry a North American who will rescue her from hell and take her to a paradise called America. As a "dancer" at the Roxy, a night club frequented by black U.S. soldiers, she earns 20 pesos (US\$ 1.00) a night. If she "goes out" with a client, the latter must pay the nightclub owner a "fine" of 280 pesos for taking a girl out of the establishment during working hours. From the amount of the fine, Mabelle will receive 30 pesos. If she fails to capture more than a few well-paying clients a month, she will be fired.

Mabelle is resigned to her working conditions. "The Roxy is a serious place. They give you clothes to wear at night, and they don't require you to strip, either there or at other



The Clark base: conversion to peaceful use?

Cover Story



Roberto Remo

A prostitute: unhealthy working conditions

nightclubs." She has found a fiancé who promised to take her to the state of Indiana in the U.S. The fact that he is black is indifferent to her: "I am half Moro and half Christian myself," she says. The only thing she regrets is that she will no longer be able to see the two children she left in Mindanao.

Mabelle is already 24, and if her boyfriend does not keep his word in the next two years, she will not only remain single but also be too old to work as a "dancer."

Each year, thousands of similar women enter the prostitution business, with the sole "comparative advantage" of being young. "Sometimes I am saddened at what they do to the 'cherry girls' (virgins)," she says. "They get the poor girls drunk, drug them, and they lose their cherry for nothing. If they were more careful, they could sell it for 4,000 pesos (approximately US\$ 200)."

Mabelle is trying to improve her English – a necessity in her work and for her future migration plans – and is taking typing lessons with the help of militants of the "New Ideas" group and a women's organization called Gabriela (after national heroine Gabriela Cilán). Both groups try to provide low-class Filipino women with alternatives to prostitution. But the most important thing for Mabelle was to learn about the risks of her profession. When a 17-year-old prostitute died of AIDS a few months ago, Mabelle decided it was time to act,

and she asked her "girlfriends" to sign a request addressed to the U.S. Embassy.

"For the sake of our own health and that of U.S. soldiers," they say, "something must be done to prevent the disease from spreading." Arguing that "the AIDS virus came from the military and not from the Philippines," they request medical assistance and financial support for their families (who will lose their only source of income) "at no cost to the Philippine government."

A similar message was passed to U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger by Earl Martin, a co-secretary for Asia in the Mennonite Central Committee – a religious organization engaged in charity activities among prostitutes.

Martin claims that at least 18 cases of AIDS have been detected at the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit of Olopago, which operates under the command of the Subic Bay naval base.

The prostitutes demand that "all Americans be subjected to medical control before they leave their bases, and that safe-conduct passes be printed to certify that their bearers are free from contamination with AIDS or other venereal diseases."

No answer, however, has been given to such a logical and sensible proposal. Until now, the preventive care of venereal diseases is limited to controlling the girls' health at "Social Hygiene" clinics, which the U.S. Air Force finances for the sole purpose of avoiding contamination of its personnel. "They keep a gallery of photos of all girls at the base," explains Mabelle, "and if one of them is caught with a venereal disease, they turn her photo upside down."

To subject the marines to this type of examination would imply a concern for the health of the girls, which obviously does not exist, and would be tantamount to an official recognition of the fact that the U.S. bases in the Philippines can have a negative effect on the country.

After the Fall

The first anniversary of the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship is marked by the resurgence of right-wing forces and popular discontent with a government dominated by former Duvalier supporters.



Reuters

Haitians took to the streets to bring down the Duvalier dictatorship in January 1986

One year after the ouster of President-for-Life Jean Claude Duvalier, Haiti is again in the throes of a political crisis. The Government Council faces growing opposition from political groups that want a return to full democratic rule, and popular discontent is growing in reaction to deteriorating economic conditions and government repression of reformists. The political boycott of General Henry Namphy's government found a dramatic expression in the

elections of October 19, when 98 percent of the population refused to vote in the plebiscite for a new constituent assembly.

On November 7 in the capital of Port-au-Prince, approximately 100,000 people — a full one-fifth of the city's population — staged the largest street demonstration in the country's history. Organized by a coalition of over 20 political and labor groups, the protesters made a ten kilometer trek through city streets, demanding that the

government address the problems of hunger and unemployment, end political persecution and stop appointing former Duvalier supporters to official positions. Similar demonstrations throughout Haiti displayed evidence of extreme discontent with the current administration.

The popular revolt was triggered by the announcement, in early November, of the creation of the Parti Renovation de l'Entente Nationale (Party for

the Renovation of the National Accord) which consists largely of former Duvalier supporters. Duvalier himself, now an exile in the French Riviera, let it be known that he was prepared to invest US\$ 13 million in the new party. The source of this money would be the US\$ 80 million that the ex-dictator spirited away when he was forced to abandon the country in February 1986.

In late September, the government released two army colonels, Jean Valme and Frank Romain, who had been jailed since the overthrow of Duvalier. Valme is a former national chief of police. Romain is hated throughout Haiti for his violent treatment of political prisoners and enemies of the dictatorship. Their release was particularly unwelcome, coming at a time when several democratic leaders, among them Hubert Roncerau, had denounced the



General Namphy

return to public functions of former officials of the Duvalier era. The Duvalier supporters were allegedly installing clandestine training

camps in an attempt to reorganize the dictatorship's hated private militia, known as the "tonton macoutes."

The people's revolt

Nearly 1,000 "tontons," of a total 30,000, were killed by Haitians shortly after the downfall of the dictatorship. The reintroduction of the hated militia would run counter to demands by democratic parties and public opinion for a "de-Duvalierization" of the country.

It became clear that the political situation was deteriorating following the "disappearance" of several neighborhood leaders and activists engaged in a literacy campaign sponsored by the Catholic Church. Police repression of street demonstrations in major Haitian towns became

Voodoo Catholicism

□ The downfall of the Duvalier dictatorship and the intense political mobilization in Haiti since the February 1986 coup have led to an entirely new phenomenon in the Caribbean nation. The Catholic Church has begun to play an increasingly active role in mobilizing the masses for the redemocratization of Haiti. This attitude is related to the influence exercised by the Liberation Theology on the behavior of many church people.


A progressive group of Catholic priests have begun to win popularity by incorporating Voodoo symbols and

mystical props into the Catholic liturgy. When drum beats began to accompany liturgical chants at Catholic ceremonies, many people felt a renewed attraction to a religion which had been the exclusive property of the rich and had tended to impose profoundly European habits and customs. Through this "Voodooization," the Catholic Church has acquired a popularity it never had before, and it has been able to capture and channel popular discontent.

The expansion of the Popular Church was so strong and swift that many other creeds, including evangelical sects of North American origin, responded by reminding their faithfuls that some *hougans* (Voodoo priests) had maintained links with the

increasingly violent, prompting demands from radical leftist sectors for the resignation of the Government Council, the installation of a provisional government, and a thorough purge of Duvalier sympathizers in the government.

In October, at a ceremony marking the end of the Supreme Court recess, the president of the Haitian Bar Association, Ernest Malebranche, violently criticized the government before an audience which included a number of ministers and military officials. A few weeks later in Cap Haitien, protesters took to the streets to demand Namphy's resignation. Ironically, General Namphy is a native of Cap Haitien, a principal town in the north of the country. The Catholic Church also joined the movement in October by publishing a pastoral letter



accusing the government of violating human rights and expressing its support for the demonstrations.

Namphy responded swiftly.

He decided to expand the army from 7,500 soldiers to 25,000 within two years, and he asked the United States to provide military instructors.

Duvalier dictatorship and had been involved in some past abuses. The resulting anti-Voodoo "Inquisition" led to the murders of several *hougans*. The persecution was criticized by intellectuals and politicians who believe Voodoo to be an integral part of Haitian society and an obstacle to foreign attempts to rob its culture of its distinctive characteristics.

Another phenomenon of the post-dictatorship era is the reemergence of creole, the dialect spoken by most Haitians, as the country's national language. French, which had been imposed by the defeated oligarchy, was quickly replaced by creole on radio and television. Creole also began to be used in universities and schools. The change imparted a fresh



A Voodoo rite

meaning to the words uttered by Cuban intellectual José Martí during a visit to Port-au-Prince nearly a century ago: "Civilization will come to Haiti via creole, or it will not come at all." G.P.C.

His move was made public just weeks after the first eleven North American advisers landed in Haiti to assist the local military and deliver crowd-control equipment which the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince called "non-lethal." With the arrival of the U.S. instructors, the country's repressive apparatus has grown almost as powerful as it was under Duvalier.

Political radicalization had a decisive impact on the October elections. The Haitian people massively boycotted the polls — only two percent participated in the balloting. The 95 percent abstention rate in Port-au-Prince stole any degree of legitimacy from the future Constituent Assembly, which is also supposed to establish an electoral timetable to go into effect in late 1987. Plans are to schedule presidential elections before then and to have the new leader take office in February 1988. This scheme, announced by the government last June, now seems highly unlikely. As soon as the voter boycott became evident, Namphy addressed the nation on television to announce his government's new economic policy. He notably refrained from commenting on the election results, which were made known only in early November in a terse official communiqué.

Economic chaos

If Haitians have serious misgivings about their political

future, they are even more worried about the country's economy. From the moment he rose to power, Namphy has implemented an economic policy based on classic International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescriptions. Haitian Finance Minister Lesly Deletour, 36, is an ardent believer in the policies of the Chicago School, notorious for its orthodox neoliberalism that inevitably leads to privatization and recession. Deletour was a World Bank official prior to being named minister at the recommendation of a North American adviser to economist Milton Freedman, the spiritual, if not the intellectual head of the Chicago School. Freedman's assistant arrived in Haiti last



Former dictator Duvalier

April to analyze the country's economic performance on behalf of the Bank. In a matter of a few months, he had antagonized most of the country. Even the business community rebelled against the government's neoliberal tactics. The Chamber of Industry and Commerce, as well as rice planters in Artibonite, called a lockout which was canceled only at the last minute. Haitian businessmen remain unhappy with government policies which ultimately may transform them into mere salesmen of foreign-made products, most of which are smuggled into the country.

The impact of the country's economic deterioration is felt most acutely in the poor neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince and in the countryside. Over half a million people live in dire health and housing conditions in the slums of the capital. Since June slum dwellers have been building barricades to prevent police action and hinder the work of tax collectors. Unrest in the shantytowns recently forced the interior minister, Colonel William Regala, to cancel a planned visit to a poor neighborhood in Port-au-Prince.

In the rural town of Les Cayes, people left homeless by a severe flood refused food aid offered by the government. Army helicopters carrying food and clothing were forced to return to their bases without delivering their cargo. In Petit

Gonaives, the entire population dressed in black to protest a visit by Regala, the number two man in the Government Council and the person believed to be directly responsible for a 1964 massacre in that city of relatives of anti-Duvalier guerrillas.

Civil insubordination has spread to the rural areas, where peasants have occupied land or tried to recover properties that had been expropriated by officials of the dictatorship. The ongoing land conflict has already led to an urban supply crisis, as large landowners have withheld their products from the market, causing a widespread food shortage. The government's attempts to retake a number of properties were frustrated by the force of a movement whose main voice and supporter is the influential Radio Soleil, run by the Catholic Church.

For all its strength, the people's rebellion has not found an expression in political parties. The political vacuum created by 30 years of dictatorship remains to be filled. The organizations that led the campaign against the old regime remained underground for too long and have not yet had time to establish themselves as legal entities. On the other hand, the possibility of elections next year has led to the emergence of dozens of political parties with short-term platforms. Although there are legal guarantees for the freedom of



The busy streets of the capital of Port-au-Prince

association, requirements for registration of parties are very strict. They are required to submit a list of at least 5,000 members with their addresses. The Haitian Unified Communist Party (PUCH) stands little chance of gaining legal status, since still in effect is a 1969 law passed by late Dictator François Duvalier, the father of the deposed dictator, establishing the death penalty for communists.

All this has benefitted those parties able to rely on greater economic support or foreign affiliations, especially those connected with the international Christian Democratic (CD) movement. Three CD delegations visited Haiti recently, and other

conservative and moderate parties are trying to establish international alliances. But the complicated electoral mechanism installed by the government is quickly losing popular support, as witnessed by the humiliating outcome of the elections.


As a result, Namphy's political timetable has lost most of its credibility, and few people expect it to work. The alternatives are either a return to authoritarian rule without Duvalier or a long period of political instability. ●

Written by Gerard Pierre-Charles*, edited by C. Castilho

* The author is a sociologist and a political leader of the Haitian left.

The Return of Macao

The Portuguese territory of Macao, a freemarket haven, will be turned over to China at the end of the 1990s. China is already preparing for the occurrence with its policy of "one country, two systems."



Macao: a capitalist commercial center being prepared for socialist administration

After 400 years of Portuguese colonial domination, the enclave of Macao – known to Asians as a “capitalist haven” – is scheduled to return to Chinese hands. This will occur at about the same time as the 1997 transfer of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China, according to an agreement which is expected to be signed in February by the Chinese and Portuguese governments.

With the incorporation of Macao, and the 1986

agreement on the transfer of Hong Kong, China will embark on a new phase of its policy of “one country, two systems.” Peking authorities hope to preserve the capitalist nature of the former European colonies while subjecting both to a socialist administration. To lay the groundwork for the transfers, the Chinese government plans to “adapt” its territories adjacent to Macao and Hong Kong to coexist with capitalism so as to avert an Asian recurrence of

the East Berlin/West Berlin syndrome. A major element of the “adaptation” process will be to bridge the economic and social gaps that currently exist.

The Portuguese occupation of Macao began formally in 1557 when a famed pirate named Chan Tsi-Lao was defeated by the Chinese thanks to the decisive help of Portuguese troops. As a result, a grateful Chinese emperor officially granted the Portuguese the right to settle there as masters and lords of

the land.

Macao thus became the first European outpost in that part of the world, and it paved the way for other Portuguese activities in the Far East. Originally a trading post, the little enclave eventually exerted a certain degree of religious and cultural influence on its neighbors.

The new colony lived its most prosperous days between 1675 and 1689, thanks to the success of Manuel Saldanha, then Portuguese Ambassador to Peking. Despite British attempts to settle in Canton, the Chinese government never revoked the exclusive trade rights accorded the Portuguese.

In 1717 a Chinese imperial decree required all British and French ships engaging in trading activities in Canton to operate from the port of Macao, thus giving the Portuguese colony total monopoly on the Western trade with China.

Macao's decline began in 1841 when the British settled in Hong Kong. Yet, despite the resulting economic dependence on China, Macao continued to lead a comfortable existence thanks to the revenues generated by its textile and marine industries and foreign trade.

In 1843, Portugal declared Macao independent from China, in a bold move which the Chinese only recognized in 1887. On the basis of this precedent, Portugal decided, under the dictatorship of António de Oliveira Salazar, to

give Macao the status of "an overseas Portuguese province."

In the wake of the Carnation Revolution in April 1975, Portugal offered control of Macao back to China. Ten years later, Portuguese President António Ramalho Eanes, a former governor of Macao, announced the opening of negotiations for the transfer of the old colony to the

and China recently met to discuss the future of Macao. Portuguese sources announced subsequently that the incorporation of Macao into China will take effect in 1997, the same year that Hong Kong will be transferred from British to Chinese control.

"One country, two systems"

The "one country, two



Deng Xiaoping: a one country, two systems policy for Macao

People's Republic of China.

At present Macao is regarded as a Portuguese "special territory". It has sovereignty in domestic matters and enjoys considerable administrative, economic and financial autonomy. However, its governors continue to be appointed by the Portuguese president.

Delegations from Portugal

systems" policy consistently advocated by China with respect to the future of Hong Kong and Macao is now being tested in China itself under the impact of the sweeping economic reforms adopted there in the past few years.

Eight years after the introduction of the "four modernizations" which were adopted in the wake of the isolationism of Mao Tse-Tung

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and the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution, China is beginning to assess the consequences of its overture toward the West and the enforcement of the social and economic reforms approved by the historic 1978 Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

The reforms and pragmatic policies proposed by Deng Xiao-Ping are largely based on

a partial rejuvenation of Communist Party and administrative cadres. The overture toward the West was intended to attract foreign capital and sophisticated technologies that would promote the modernization of the country and improve its

standard of living. However, the Chinese press has exposed several instances of abuse of power and influence peddling, corruption and contraband among high government officials, as well as a recent

A Capitalist Paradise

□ Its entire territory measures only 16.4 square kilometers - one-third of which is the Peninsula of Macao; the rest consists of nearby islands. The peninsula has always ranked ahead of the islands of Taipa and Coloane in terms of economic importance.

With a fixed population of 400,000 and an untold number of visitors, Macao boasts the highest populational density in the world. The local population provides cheap manpower, unprotected by legal contracts or effective labor laws. Along with easy credit and fiscal incentives, this makes Macao a real capitalist paradise - "um negocio da China" as the Portuguese like to say, or the ideal place "to make a killing."

Although it imports most of the raw materials it needs and nearly all its essential consumer goods, Macao had a positive trade balance of US\$ 125 million in 1985. That year, the number one importer of its fabrics and garments, toys, and clay and leather products was the United States, followed by the People's Republic of China and the European Economic Community.

Since it won administrative autonomy in 1975, Macao has twice enjoyed government surpluses - in 1980 and 1985.



Macao's Cassino Flutuante

Last year, however, tax revenues amounted to US\$ 265 million, while public expenditures rose to US\$ 300 million - a deficit of US\$ 35 million.

Of the 4.3 million visitors who entered Macao in 1985, less than 500,000 were strictly tourists. The remainder, most of them Hong Kong residents, were headed for the blackjack tables and roulette wheels of the casinos.

According to official figures, Macao's legally authorized casinos produced some US\$ 55 million in fiscal receipts in 1985, or approximately 40 percent of the territory's total revenues. Operating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, gambling is Macao's greatest attraction: there are no casinos in nearby Hong Kong.

(C.J. and R.B.C.)

increase in criminal activity and delinquency.

The fundamental principles of the reform were the return to material incentives in order to increase productivity, the reliance on private entrepreneurship in rural areas, and the partial deregulation of previously controlled prices. However, the Communist Party committee charged with evaluating the reforms has noted several negative trends. For instance, it reported that the new rural policy has caused less successful farmers to abandon their fields in favor of higher paying jobs elsewhere, especially in industry and trade, and that price deregulation has led to illegal price increases and speculation.

The reforms have had their greatest impact on those areas singled out for special economic development – particularly Shenzhen and Zhuhai, which are located near Hong Kong and Macao. These regions of China were intended to become “wealth belts” capable of promoting a gradual, bilateral assimilation of the two opposing economic systems. To what extent and how long the “one country, two systems” experiment can be maintained will be known only after 1997.

“Privileged relations”

For Macao residents, the number one priority is to preserve political stability in their territory as the basis for



Eduardo Tomé

Daily life continues despite the prospect of change

development and prosperity. This concern over stability may lead them to favor a continuing Portuguese presence.

A small European country, Portugal can use Macao, in the words of a well-informed economist, “as a major tool for privileged relations now and in the future with one of the world’s largest economic, political and military powers – China.”

Garcia Leandro, Macao’s first governor appointed after the 1975 revolution in Portugal, maintains that the Portuguese should not be forced to leave just because

the territory will be turned over to China. “There are an unlimited number of possibilities”, he noted, “and I believe the territory can be handled as a Portuguese-Chinese joint venture.”

Most Portuguese would prefer to see the transition occur as slowly as possible, for the sake of stability and future Portuguese interests in the area. Of course, China will have the last word on the matter, and sinologists agree that Peking has no doubts about the future of Macao. ●

Reported by Cecilia Jorge and R. B. Coelho; edited by V. Bachetta

Africa/Malawi

South Africa's Great Black Hope

President-for-Life Banda has turned Malawi into a base for South Africa's effort to destabilize the Mozambican government.



President-for-Life Banda cheered on by a group of supporters

Many Malawis believe that their President-for-Life Hastings Kamuzu Banda is endowed with supernatural powers. Thus, the visit made by late Mozambican President Samora Machel to the Malawi capital of Blantyre last September to demand that Banda withdraw his support of Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) rebels, was perceived as risky business. When Machel died in an airplane crash a month later, the superstitious believed that Machel had been killed by the old man's "army of bees."

This belief may not be entirely unfounded. Banda

does appear to be protected by an army of bees, although not all of them of the African kind. In addition to dozens of military instructors supplied by South Africa, a number of Israeli advisers have also recently set up camp in Blantyre. Besides helping to protect old man Banda, these foreign advisers are helping him to turn the country into a base for South Africa's destabilizing attacks on Mozambique and other southern African countries that oppose apartheid.

Banda has long maintained links to South Africa and to the MNR — a South Afri-

can-sponsored armed band that has been harassing Mozambique ever since the latter won its full independence in 1974. The only new ingredient is the addition of Israeli support in this war of attrition against Mozambique, which South Africa seems to want to divide in two: the apartheid regime appears intent on driving a wedge along the corridor leading to Luabo on the Mozambican seacoast.


This intricate web of political, military and economic intrigue began to unravel immediately after the summit of the Non-Aligned

Movement in Harare, Zimbabwe, last September. At that meeting, Machel not only asked his counterparts in southern Africa – the presidents of Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana and Tanzania – to join him in the effort to stop Banda's open support of the MNR, but he also proposed an economic and military boycott of Malawi should Banda refuse to comply. Machel's scheme immediately illicited a number of threats from South Africa. In fact, President P.W. Botha seems determined to save the skin of his old black ally, who has consistently denied extending any help to the MNR – despite abundant evidence to the contrary.

Border tensions

Late last October, Banda's denials were again proven false by journalists who visited the Malawi-Mozambican border. Mozambican soldiers deployed along the south Malawi border told the reporters that the MNR had launched a major attack against the CAIA agrobusiness complex on October 3, only weeks after Machel officially denounced Banda's involvement with the MNR during a trip to Japan.

Mozambican public employees residing near the border claim that the region has never been as tense as it has been in the past few months. MNR rebels have launched terrorist attacks against the Mozambican



population, apparently in collusion with the Malawi border patrol. When rumors of an MNR attack begin to spread and it appears imminent, Malawi border officials inexplicably disappear from their posts, allowing the MNR bands to destroy military and public facilities on the Mozambican side. Later, Malawi residents cross the border and ransack the rubble. Once the destruction is complete, the Malawi border officials return to their stations as though nothing had happened.

Similar raids have occurred sporadically since Mozambique won its independence, but they have escalated in frequency and violence since Banda signed the Nkomati agreement with South Africa in February 1984. The agreement allows

South Africa to concentrate in Malawi the elite of the MNR troops, who are trained by Israeli and South African instructors stationed in Blantyre.

The Malawi constitution forbids the government from keeping regular armed forces, but in reality the country's 7,000-strong police force operates as a proxy army. It includes a swift deployment unit styled after the western Mobile Forces and a dreaded secret police – the so-called Special Branch – which has been responsible for several border raids. Mozambican army officers have accused both the Malawi secret police and Israeli advisers of torturing captured Mozambican soldiers. Recently, a group of 1,500 Mozambican troops who had

drifted into Malawi territory during an encounter with the MNR were held under arrest and maltreated before being repatriated – with the Blantyre government blandly declaring that the prisoners were MNR members who were being handed over to Mozambique.

The Rombezia corridor

Paradoxically, most of the weapons used by the Malawi-based MNR bands are trucked from South Africa through Mozambique and Zimbabwe along dirt roads, under the protection of armed escorts. Mozambican and Zimbabwean officials are prevented by existing international agreements from inspecting the contents of the trucks. Their suspicions, however, were confirmed in early 1986 when one of the trucks rolled over and spilled its load of rifles, grenades and ammunition.

Although Mozambique could theoretically put a stop to the arms supply, the consequences of such a move could prove serious. It might prompt a South African invasion of southern Mozambique, and a Mozambican blockade of these shipments would at least create an embarrassing situation for signatories of the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), which include several former British colonies, such as Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya – in addition to Malawi. Under the PTA, cargos shipped by member countries enjoy

special privileges while in transit through Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

At the height of the crisis which preceded Machel's death, the former Mozambican president threatened to deploy missiles along the border with Malawi in order to improve Mozambican defenses against the MNR. But as of late October, when Machel died, he had not followed through on the threat. Mozambican troops stationed in the area are increasingly frustrated by the military stalemate. Although they are permanently harassed by the MNR bands, they cannot pursue them into Malawi territory. To further complicate matters, operating freely in the area are helicopters supplied to Malawi by South Africa. In October, one of them landed in Mozambican territory next to a Mozambican mobile television unit which was filming one of the MNR attacks. Shortly afterwards, the helicopter returned to Malawi without molesting the TV crew members.

Given that Malawi is the base for the elite troops of the MNR, and that the latter are extensively aided by South Africa and Israel, Mozambican diplomats and military leaders believe that Banda still hopes to create a no-man's-land out of a strip of territory connecting the extreme south of Malawi to the Mozambican port of Luabo.

The idea of establishing such a corridor is an old one which predates Mozambican

independence. Banda was then supporting the African National Union of Rombezia (UNAR), a separatist movement created by the Portuguese secret police and organized by the then-Portuguese consul in Blantyre, millionaire Jorge Jardim. UNAR's objective was to establish just such a strip of land, outside of the control of the nationalist Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the organization which eventually expelled the Portuguese and took power in Mozambique. According to the UNAR plans, Mozambique was to be split into two sections separated by the so-called Rombezia corridor. The southern part was expected to fall under South African control, while the north was to remain in FRELIMO hands.

After independence, the Rombezia scheme was dropped, in part because it violated the rules established by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) regarding the preservation of existing borders. The UNAR subsequently transformed itself into the Free Africa Movement, still under Jardim's leadership. It was disbanded in 1980 when the Mozambican army destroyed its main military bases.

In 1984, however, it was rumored that the South African government, in collusion with Banda, was planning to revive both the UNAR and the Rombezia issue, this time using the sheer

force of arms and economic influence. At present it appears that South Africa has achieved at least part of its goal: last July the independent British TV station ITN aired a documentary produced by a crew of cameramen who traveled by land from the coast to Malawi along the dirt roads of the Rombezia corridor, under the protection of armed MNR personnel.


However, Mozambican troops still patrol the 1,200-kilometer long corridor, which is mostly devoid of economic value, except at its extremities. Major sugar mills are located at one end in Luabo, while on the other side are the fertile lands of the Angonia complex and the Moatise coal reserves. Nevertheless, should Malawi increase its military pressure, the MNR may soon gain access to the sea, thus enabling it to dispense with the current supply routes through Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

According to military and diplomatic sources in the Mozambican capital of Maputo, this is the real purpose behind the present MNR offensive in central Mozambique. These officials scoff at the claims made by South African Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha who says that documents retrieved from the destroyed presidential aircraft reveal that Machel was planning to intervene militarily in Malawi.

An enigmatic dictator

It is Banda himself who has

most intrigued diplomats, politicians, political scientists and journalists with an interest in African affairs. Born in 1902, he lived half of his life abroad, first in the former Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, and South Africa, and later in the United States, where he received a degree in medicine. He later worked as a doctor in England and Ghana



Aleke Banda

before returning to his native Malawi in 1958. There he soon rose to the leadership of a nationalist movement that later became the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP). The son of a traditional family, Dr. Banda had little difficulty in imposing his patriarchal, authoritarian style on the party and, after independence in July 1964, on the government. Under his initial administration, any hint of dissent was immediately branded

as treason.

President Banda was quick to give full vent to his totalitarian leanings. In the first few months after independence, when his ministers demanded a greater degree of authority in administrative matters, he simply fired the entire cabinet. Two years later, he proclaimed the Republic of Malawi and named himself president-for-life. In 1970 he became the first black chief of state on the African continent to maintain diplomatic relations with the apartheid regime, arguing that Malawi could benefit from economic cooperation with South Africa.

By 1971, a growing number of Malawi politicians were being arrested or simply eliminated. Most of them were public officials who had demanded greater autonomy in their functions, or political figures whom the world press had tabbed as likely political heirs to Banda. One of these was a relative of the president named Aleke, who was the MCP secretary-general and had been cited by the *Times of Zambia* as Banda's probable successor. Aleke was arrested and is still being held a prisoner at the penitentiary of Zomba.

Even worse was the fate of Albert Muwalo Nqumayo, who also attained the post of MCP secretary-general. Accused of treason by a jury personally selected by Banda, he was sentenced to death and executed in 1977. Since then,

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Representatives of the Front Line states, which oppose Banda

the job of secretary-general of Malawi's sole party has been understandably regarded as a very dangerous one.

The list of fallen MCP secretary-generals is a long one. Gwanda Phiri has been in jail since 1979 under a 22-year prison sentence. Bakili Moluzi was dismissed from his job in 1981 and forced to live in exile in a small village. In 1983, Dick Matenje died mysteriously in an automobile accident, shortly after having criticized Banda's decision to take a full year's vacation in England and appoint the then-president of the Bank of Malawi, John Tembo, as his temporary replacement. Since Matenje's death no other Malawi politician has dared to accept the position of secretary-general of the MCP.

In 1983, a new *eminence grise* emerged behind the throne in Malawi — Tembo's niece "Lady" Cecilia Kadzimir. Her position is technically that of the president's Official Hostess, but her informal relations with the

old dictator have given rise to speculation that, thanks to her, Tembo is considered Banda's most likely successor. Together, she and Tembo control the two mainstays of the Banda regime — women and the police.

Capitalizing on the traditional predominance of women in African families, Banda had, even before independence, dedicated special attention to his female subjects. They call him the Nkhoswe (Protector) of *mbumbas* (women) for having created the Women's League, an organization that holds a monopoly on the sale of alcoholic beverages in the country, in addition to enjoying certain special privileges in private bids for the installation of trading shops. In recognition for the economic advantages granted them by the dictator, Malawi women have made him their champion. All of the estimated 200,000 members of the league wear a band around their waists bearing his smiling

effigy. On national holidays and presidential birthdays, hundreds of *mbumbas* gather before the Sanjika House, the official presidential residence in Blantyre, to perform songs and dances.

Many Malawis believe that the Women's League is in reality the country's dominant political party and that the MCP consists merely of candidates to positions in the cabinet and provincial governments. Lady Cecilia's power has grown so strong in the past few years that she has recently decided to create her own women's organization, with no objections from Banda. Tembo, her protégé, is also considered very powerful, and constant rumors peg him as the key man in forging Malawi's relations with South Africa, Israel and the MNR. He is likely to be a key figure in South Africa's policy designed to destabilize Mozambique. And according to sources in Maputo, he has often negotiated with the South Africans behind Banda's back.

The president-for-life, probably feeling the weight of Mozambican pressure, recently sent Tembo to try to appease Maputo authorities. But there is little hope of a lasting understanding. Not only does Malawi have strong links to South Africa, but old man Banda seems more confident than ever in his personal army of bees.

Carlos Castilho and
Pedro Pimenta
from Maputo

Women/Papua New Guinea

Victims of Progress

Traditionally, women had an equal role in agricultural production. The legacy of colonialism is male dominance of the sector, poor nutrition and the exploitation of women.

The part that women play in subsistence agriculture is of vital importance as it contributes directly to the survival of the family. Feeding the population in Papua New Guinea is, as in all countries, an important national function. However, both national and provincial governments do very little to improve subsistence agriculture. Food is the most basic need of all people and therefore food production, to feed the people, is the first priority of any community or nation. Women in Papua New Guinea contribute significantly in this vital, but nationally neglected, subsistence economy.

Women's role in traditional society

Papua New Guinea is a diverse society in which over seven hundred languages are spoken. Despite the many different tribes, each with its own traditions, beliefs and values, there are in general certain common norms that

define the expected roles of males and females. Traditionally there is a division of sex roles, where men and women are expected to perform certain tasks. Generally, women's primary roles are producing food, child-rearing, and caring for domesticated animals, etc., while men are expected to perform the more muscular tasks such as the clearing of new garden sites,

building houses, maintaining fences, hulling out canoes, fishing or hunting. In a traditional society, everyone has a particular duty to perform for the well-being of the community.

Women in Papua New Guinea have traditionally played a very important part in the community, producing food to feed the family and bringing up the children.

Throughout Papua New Guinea, subsistence agriculture practices are similar. In the past every member of the family had clear roles to play. When a new garden was made, children, youths and adults worked together, each knowing what they had to do. Neighbors and relatives also helped. In return, when food was harvested, the owner

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Women play an essential economic role in traditional society



Food production is a female responsibility

of the garden shared the harvests with neighbors as "payment" for their help. Relatives normally would be given a portion of the garden to plant their own food crops.

There are tasks each member has to perform when new gardens are cleared. Men and youths will slash and burn a new garden site. They then collect all the big pieces of wood and pile them either on the side of the garden or in the cleared area, to be used as firewood when dry. Women and young girls collect leaves and smaller branches and pile them up to burn. Men dig out tree stumps to give more planting space, leaving behind the huge stumps.

In the highlands, it is a normal practice to dig drains for drainage purposes. In water-logged areas, drains are dug to get rid of excess water and also to serve as drainage. Normally, clearing and burning of garden sites is done during the dry season. Whilst clearing is done, seeds and planting material are being

prepared. Planting begins after clearing of the garden site.

There are some food crops which men alone are responsible for planting. Likewise, other crops are left to women. For example, in the highlands there are certain seedlings which men are responsible for planting such as sugarcane, bananas, and pit pit (edible *saccharum edule*), while women plant corn (maize), green leafy vegetables, beans and cucumbers. Girls work closely with their mothers and elderly women, while young boys work alongside older men. For the young people, it is a learning process, an educational experience where ideas, methods and gardening rituals are passed on to the younger generation.

Weeding and general tending of the garden is done by women and girls. Harvesting is also a function performed by women, as is food preparation for consumption.

For a sweet potato garden, farmers have their own criteria

for site selection. Normally men clear the area and make drains or mounds. In higher altitude areas mounds are jointly made by men and women. Collection and planting of sweet potatoes is carried out by women. Weeding, harvesting and cooking are primarily women's responsibilities.

While women tend the gardens, men are occupied with some other activities such as mending fences, building houses, helping another member of the village make a new garden or taking part in tribal warfare. In a traditional subsistence agriculture society, every member of the family is occupied in doing something. Everyone feels part of, and participates fully in, the social and economic activities of the community.

Apart from producing food for the family, women also are responsible for the children's welfare and upbringing. Women pass on to children the morals and whatever the children need to know at an early age. Both males and females grow up together in their early childhood period. When boys reach ten years, they accompany their uncles and fathers, while girls of that age accompany their mothers in communal or village chores.

Western influences on women

During the colonial period, there was much emphasis on cash cropping and large scale livestock development proj-

These agricultural patterns and systems were very new to individuals who had a long history of subsistence gardening, where slash and burn had been their traditional method.

The introduction of Western Christianity into Papua New Guinea's communities has changed lifestyle patterns, beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. Tribal warfare and ceremonial activities have been stopped. The general trend of people's attitudes was that the Christian belief or Western Christianity was a better way of life than their own.

Western missionaries went throughout the country converting people to believe in and practice Christianity in the way they (the missionaries) perceived. Following the colonial government came administrators who kept up that foreign system of government. Missionaries and government officials played a complementary role in the early takeover days of Papua New Guinea.

Colonial expansion exerted a significant impact upon subsistence agricultural life. The role of women in the traditional community changed; women in some areas assumed more responsibilities and performed duties which men had carried out in the past.

In some communities, men were taken out as laborers to work on cocoa, copra and rubber plantations far away from their own village

environment. For example, a number of highlanders were recruited as plantation laborers to work in plantations in the coastal regions. This resulted in women assuming more work doing what they used to do and at the same time performing work normally done by men.

In Papua New Guinea's urban cities and towns there exists a sector of village women who have migrated either to accompany their



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Western influences are growing husbands who are employed or younger women in search of a better life. Women whose roles had been that of subsistence food producers are now exposed to a very different environment. They either live in an overcrowded settlement area or in a Housing Commission house with very little room for gardening activity. These women are in a situation where they are dependent and feel isolated.

Some village women in urban areas have occupied themselves in gardening on vacant government land. In Lae, the adjoining atzera hills have been overgardened, causing landslips, excess water run-off and destruction of the environment. The quality of food produced in these areas is declining due to the loss of soil fertility and infestation of destructive insects. Women are continuing to make gardens to keep themselves occupied and to supplement their husbands' low incomes. These activities are not the same as in the village, but at least these women are trying their best to exist in an urban environment.

Perceptions of women

It has been noticed that a woman will sell the best food she produces; the rest is consumed by the family. Food quality is low and meals are normally unbalanced, resulting in malnutrition. Women from the rural areas think that things from towns and cities are good. Therefore, what little money they may have they spend on unhealthy foods such as cheesepops, biscuits, lolliwater, etc. People in general have false notions of change and the impression that Western civilization is superior to their Melanesian tradition.

Younger women migrating to towns seeking a better, easier life have ended up being prostitutes in order to survive. Prostitutes are seen as individuals of low morals within the community. There

is little understanding or respect for these women, yet they have a constitutional right to be in Papua New Guinea.

Agricultural extension training was geared to producing manpower for cash cropping and large-scale livestock production. Before independence, only men were recruited in agricultural colleges. Many Western academics (anthropologists etc.) have interpreted women in Papua New Guinea as beasts of burden. This is not true. Outsiders should not claim they can learn the customs and traditions of a particular tribe, or even a province, within the short period involved in researching a thesis. The role of women in the community in Papua New Guinea has been misinterpreted on the international scene.

The majority of agricultural extension workers meet with men in the village while women are actually out in the field, either clearing, planting, weeding or harvesting the families' food. The agricultural extension officers' role was to advise farmers on new techniques directed towards raising farm productivity and improving living standards for farmers. Women who were actually working in the gardens never benefited from the extension services of the government: they continued to follow their own gardening systems.

During the colonial period, the Department of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries introduced new cash crops such as coffee,



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Women's roles are misinterpreted

cocoa, copra and rubber. People were told that they could get money for these crops. Villagers established cash crops on their best gardens near their homes. This meant that the women had to cover some distance to cultivate land to produce their families' food. Large-scale livestock production, especially cattle under village conditions, led to many problems because expatriate cattle projects on either government land or on land purchased from village people had modern technology to assist in continuous, high-quality production. Villagers divided their days into community activities and food production while at the same time managing whatever projects were established. Women also spent time working on cash crops, besides their normal duties.

Policies since independence

In 1975, when Papua New Guinea became independent,

female students were recruited into agricultural colleges to undertake agricultural courses and graduate as extension officers. This was done in the hope that there would be more contact with women who were involved in cultivating the land. However, these female extension officers seem to have fallen into the same trap as their male counterparts, just traveling to see and advise on cash crops. There are few female officers who are attempting to work with women at a subsistence level. It seems that individual attitudes, commitment and ability to adapt and accept village women as they are is a key to extension work for female extension officers.

Women in Papua New Guinea are experts in gardening in their own way. For new practices to be accepted, the benefits (i.e., in terms of a good harvest) have to be proven. This means that one has to wait for a whole cycle to prove that the advice being given is worthwhile. Many times, extension officers introduce particular crops and then never return.

Subsistence agriculture has never been a priority in government development plans. Politicians talk about improving subsistence agriculture and improving village conditions in terms of work and government finance; little has been done to introduce and improve simple and appropriate technologies that will increase subsistence food production. The majority

of Papua New Guinea's people still live on food produced by subsistence gardening.

Today, in many parts of Papua New Guinea, women are having problems producing enough good quality food to feed their families. Population pressures have forced people to over-garden their land, which has led to loss of soil fertility and erosion. The long fallow periods of the past, which gave enough time for the land to regain its organic fertility, are no longer with us.

In other areas, where population is not so dense, women are walking long distances to cultivate good, fertile soil to plant their food crops. Land close to the villages is no longer suitable, or is planted with cash crops, or has developed into grassland due to continued overuse.

Women are also facing social problems such as men spending their time consuming alcohol and neglecting to work. Fatherless children are being born because traditional morals and strict behavior of the two sexes are not observed in many villages today. Change has become more diverse and rapid in Papua New Guinea, and this directly affects traditional cultural structures and norms. There is a demand for innovation and simple appropriate techniques which subsistence farmers can integrate into their present farming methods. These are necessary to improve food production and prevent deterioration of their land

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Subsistence agriculture: a need for appropriate technology

resources, to help village farmers to survive, to restore their dignity and to help them adapt to the destructive changes caused by big development projects sponsored by government and foreign investments.


In fact, there has been little or no real effort to improve subsistence food production. If there was an economic recession in Papua New Guinea, 80% of the village people would be almost unaffected because their livelihood does not depend on imported goods.

The Morobe Women's Association, a recently established provincial women's organization, is aware of the importance of subsistence food production that involves womanpower. The association has considered problems that women are facing and has

come up with policies for provincial governments to consider in their overall provincial development plans. The association maintains that women's development must be part and parcel of the whole community. Women should not be isolated from the community in which they live. Any program, course, etc. conducted or organized by the association has to involve the whole community. In the past, many change agents have isolated women's activities from those of the rest of the community. This method has failed. The association would like avoid past mistakes such as the dissemination of information to men in the village and not to women. ●

Fingke Z. Samana


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Joh. Enschedé en Zonen

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A War of Words

Professor Edward Herman demonstrates in this article how the White House distorts the meaning of the term terrorism in order to justify its actions around the world.

For the average citizen of the West, the idea of the United States as a sponsor of international terrorism – let alone the dominant sponsor – would appear utterly incomprehensible. After all, one reads daily that the United States is leading the charge against something it calls “terrorism,” and it regularly assails its allies for dragging their feet in responding to terrorism. On the other hand,

the U.S. government has organized a mercenary army to attack Nicaragua, and even provided it with a printed manual of recommended acts of sabotage and murder, which has been implemented by the proxy army, at the cost of well over a thousand Nicaraguan civilian lives. The U.S. government has given unstinting support to the apartheid government of South Africa, which has

invaded, and organized its own mercenary armies, to subvert a string of frontline states, again at the cost of many thousands of civilian lives. The western media, however, never refer to the United States or South Africa as “terrorist states”, even though both of them have killed vastly greater numbers than Muammar Qaddafi or the Red Brigades.

The reason for the western misperception is that the powerful define terrorism, and the western media loyally follow the agenda of their own leaders. The powerful naturally define terrorism to exclude their own acts and those of their friends and clients.

“If I don’t like it, call it terrorism.”

The current administration



Reagan with contra leaders Adolfo Calero, Alfonso Robelo and Arturo Cruz

in Washington has found it possible arbitrarily to designate any group or country which it opposes as "terrorist," and this will be transmitted to the public by the mass media without serious criticism or laughter. In his speech before the American Bar Association on July 8, 1985, President Reagan named five states as engaging in serious state terrorism - North Korea, Libya, Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The Soviet Union was presumably omitted because of the upcoming Summit meeting. The media reported that Syria had been spared as "a gesture of gratitude" to President Hafez Assad for his role in negotiating the release of 39 U.S. hostages in Lebanon! The press failed to discuss the fact that South Africa and Guatemala (among others) were omitted, that Nicaragua does not murder its own citizens as South Africa and Guatemala have done on a large scale, and that Nicaragua has not invaded other countries or organized subversive forces to destabilize other countries, as South Africa has done in many places and as the United States does quite openly to Nicaragua itself. The ludicrousness and hypocrisy of the United States calling Nicaragua a terrorist state was entirely unnoticed and without effect on the objective reporting by the U.S. press. With a compliant mass media, especially in the United States but also among its clients, terror is what the

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A Mozambican bridge destroyed in a South African attack

powerful U.S. government declares to be terror. As it is now using the concept with audacious and arbitrary abandon, it is employing the "If I don't like it, call it terrorism" definition of terrorism.

Exclusion of State Terrorism: Retail Versus Wholesale Terror

In its semantic manipulation of terrorism and related words, a number of devices are used by the United States and its intellectual spokespersons to differentiate friends and self from "terrorists." Perhaps the most important is to confine the use of the word to non-state actors and actions; i. e., to define terrorism as the use of violence to oppose governments. This departs from standard and traditional usage, according to which terrorism is a mode of governing as well as of opposing governments by means of intimidation.

By excluding governments, South Africa, Guatemala, and Israel are removed from the category of terrorist, while the African National Congress (ANC), rebel groups in Guatemala, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are automatically eligible. This is grotesque in terms of both numbers of victims and forms of violence employed by state and non-state intimidators, but it is extremely convenient in terms of western priorities and interests. The governments protected by this word usage are allies, clients, and self; the groups automatically made "terrorists" oppose these clients and western defense of the status quo.¹

To focus more sharply on the absurdity of this definitional system, I shall use the concepts of "retail" and "wholesale" terror: dissident individuals and groups kill on a retail basis (that is, on a small scale, with limited resources to kill and with small numbers of victims); states kill wholesale.

This fairly obvious but neglected point is displayed dramatically by a comparison of the numbers killed by state and non-state terrorists in recent decades. Single incidents of state terrorism frequently involve many more killings than multi-year totals for non-state terrorists (not to speak of the vastly greater numbers allocable to state terrorists on a multiyear basis).

In fact, the multi-year aggregates between 1968 and 1982 for the Baader-Meinhof group (40 victims), the Red Brigades (90), and the bogeymen of the western media, the PLO (282), even when taken together fall short of the totals for single episodes of violence by South Africa, El Salvador and Israel. Over 600 died as a result of the South African assault on the Kassinga refugee camp in Angola in 1978; a similar number died in the Rio Sumpul massacre in El Salvador in 1980; and between 1,900 and 3,500 died in the September 1982 Israeli attacks in Lebanon on Sabra and Shatila. The evidence suggests that if we were to allow state (wholesale) terror to be included in our definition of terror and give it attention remotely proportional to numbers, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel and the United States itself would be pushed to center stage. The Red Brigades and the PLO would recede to the background. But this would not conform to the demands of western power.

Terrorism Versus "Retaliation"

A second important device allowing "terrorist" to be applied only to the enemy is distinguishing between terrorism and "retaliation," and simply asserting that we and our friends only "retaliate" to somebody else's "terrorism." In a sequence of violence, it is often very difficult to determine where the process began, and thus the distinction between terror and retaliation

hijackings of ships. A note found on the body of one of the Rome terrorists speaks of vengeance for the Israeli-sponsored massacres of Palestinianians at Shatila and Shaba, but this was not taken seriously in the West as making the Rome attacks merely "retaliation" for a prior terrorism.² As Israel is a client of the United States, the West allows Israel to kill always in "retaliation," never as terrorism, whereas the PLO and other Palestinian groups are



The ruins of a PLO base following an Israeli air attack

is often arbitrary and depends on the ability of one side to establish its claim by sheer power. Thus, when Israel bombed Tunis, killing 20 Tunisian bystanders as well as many more Palestinians, the Reagan administration and the West accepted this as "retaliation," even though the action at Larnaca that allegedly elicited the Tunis attack was explicitly stated by its perpetrators to have been a retaliatory act against Mossad agents involved in Israeli

never allowed to be retaliating; they only engage in terrorism.³

Terrorists as Indiscriminate Killers

Terrorists are also sometimes distinguished from non-terrorist perpetrators of violence by an alleged randomness or indiscriminate-ness in their attacks. This is presumably less moral than non-random killing, and the claim is used to lend an aura of evil to terrorists and

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benignness to the other (frequently state) killers. Well-targeted killing, however, is not evidently more decent than random killing, unless the targeted victims are thought to be deserving of their fate. If redheads, or school teachers were targeted, would this be morally superior to random killing? If, however, the targeted are alleged to be Communists or PLO officials, in the West this may give the requisite moral aura. Frequently, of course, the targeted victims are not the only casualties, as in Tunis, but the claim of having gone after a "legitimate" target helps justify the casualties that are allegedly unintended.

As a question of fact, however the Palestian PLO, or SWAPO in Namibia, or the NLF in Vietnam, have not been more prone to indiscriminate killing than state terrorists. Most non-state dissident acts of violence are carefully targeted at some

symbol of abuse, and in the case of the NLF in South Vietnam, non-selective violence was punishable as alienating the popular base sought by NLF strategy. Where dissidents take hostages, of course, the victims are often random, but neither the number of such cases nor the ensuing casualties have been large.⁴

On the other hand, state terror also presents a mixed picture of targeted and indiscriminate killing. State terrorists in Latin America have deliberately sought out political activists and leaders and cadres of organized groups, but where the targeted groups are large and diverse, and the term "cadres" is defined broadly (*e.g.*, active union members), the policies are reasonably described as indiscriminate. Furthermore, state terror is often very "generous" in attacking civilians at large where these

are seen as a virtual enemy population. McClintock points out that "in the case of a mass-based insurgency, seconded by the vast majority of the population, the perception of the 'innocent civilian' becomes obscured." He contends that in Guatemala and El Salvador in the mid-1980s, and in the last years of Somoza, the tactics of state terror "have taken on an almost random, mass-oriented form."

The point applies to the U.S. assault on Indochina. The essence of U.S. policy in Indochina was the massive use of firepower in the countryside, based on minimal targeting information. Civilian deaths were seen as having the merits of reducing an enemy population, forcing an exodus into the cities, arousing intense fear, and occasionally even killing an enemy soldier. In the U.S. mass media, B-52 raids were generally reported to be directed at "enemy base camps," parroting the language of Pentagon press releases. This was partly true, in that the villages attacked did house a population supportive of the rebels. Clearly, however, bombing addressed to an entire rural population is reasonably described as indiscriminate. This is reflected in the staggering casualty rates that were imposed on the defenseless peasant populations.

These policies have been brought to El Salvador where the United States is now carrying out, mainly but not



Funeral procession of slain Salvadoran opposition leaders



Reuters

U. S. fighters aboard the USS Saratoga, off the coast of Libya

entirely by a proxy army and airforce, a Vietnam-style anti-peoples war in the countryside. Casualty levels are huge, but the western media have turned their attention to "terrorism." The same points apply to Israeli bombing raids during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and those currently being carried out against Shi'ite villages in Southern Lebanon, with heavy firepower directed at heavily populated civilian areas and therefore involving essentially random killing. Again, the West is not aroused and does not talk about going to the "source" of these killings; they are not "terrorism."

Terrorists as Manipulators of the Media

Another basis on which western terrorism experts attempt to confine attention to individual and small group actions rather than the more massive state violence is by focusing on the alleged manipulation of the media by terrorists. Terrorism may even be defined by the use of violence in conjunction with a search for media publicity. Some retail terrorist activities are designed to attract attention to grievances, and the terrorists count on the media giving publicity to their hijackings and taking of hostages. State terrorists, by contrast, do not rely on the media in their own processes of intimidation, because their capacity for violence is sufficiently great to have the

desired effects without deliberate enlistment of publicity. In fact, the problem for state terrorists is *keeping the media quiet*, so that violence can be carried out without undue public reaction.

As dissident terrorists seek publicity, while state terrorists shun it as interfering with their freedom to kill, it is obvious that a focus on the "theater of terror" automatically serves an apologetic function. It also allows conservatives to berate the media for "encouraging terrorism" by giving the terrorists a great deal of publicity. This involves a double deception. One is the implication that the media treat dissident terrorists sympathetically. While the media occasionally do convey some of the grievances of the terrorists and allow them to appear in a human light, media coverage of terrorist events is still heavily dominated by official views and by a focus on the fate of the victims. In the aftermath of the actions these emphases and recri-

mation against the terrorists are overwhelming.

The second deception is more serious. The analysts of the "terror theater" fail to see the important role that publicity about dissident terror plays in sanctioning state terrorism. It was not a coincidence that the great increase in western attention to "terrorism" has accompanied the Reagan arms buildup, placement of missiles in Western Europe, and more aggressive attacks by the United States and its surrogates against Nicaraguans, Lebanese, Angolans, and Salvadoran rebels. Reagan's explicit shift in emphasis from "human rights" to "terrorism" was virtual acknowledgement of support for state terrorists and simultaneous diversion of attention to lesser terrorists.⁵ The great attention now given to the theater of terror doesn't help the retail terrorists;⁶ it strengthens the claims of those who only "retaliate" to the terror of others. The Reagan administration's manipulation

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of the Libyan threat, from the mythical "hit squads" of 1981 to the deliberately provoked encounters off the Libyan coast and recent direct attacks, have been designed to shift attention from the assault on Central America, the Palestinians and other assorted Arab groups, and the frontline states of South Africa and to mobilize western populations for aggressive adventures abroad. The "theater of terror" is managed from Washington to serve its perceived interests.

My Terror as "Counter-terror"

Another frequently encountered concept in western terrorism semantics is "counter-terrorism." As the United States and its clients, like South Africa, El Salvador, and Guatemala, do not (by definition) engage in terrorism, their attacks on their enemies require alternative words. One, as we have seen, is retaliation. But retaliation implies a response to an immediately preceding act. We need a word that allows a more continuous assault on the bases and populations of "terrorists." The gap has been filled by the concept of "counter-terror." For us and our allies, immediate violent responses are retaliation; longer-term attacks are counter-terror. Thus, South Africa's systematic assaults on its neighbors to induce them to refuse sanctuary to the ANC


and Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) – "terrorists" in western semantics and political language⁷ – are counter-terrorism. Similarly, the massacres of peasants carried out by the Guatemalan state to root out any opposition (i. e., "terrorists") is counter-terror.⁸ In short, what in western terrorism semantics is called "counter-terror" is in reality a dressed up form of state (wholesale) terror.

"International Terrorism" and its Supporters

A final semantic adjustment is needed so that the western establishment can tar certain disfavored states with the terrorist brush. This is done with the aid of the concept of an "international terrorist," who either kills across national borders or kills with the support of a foreign power. In western terrorism semantics, a *state* whose agents cross a border to kill is not engaging in "international terrorism," nor is aiding a state that employs systematic violence supporting international terrorism. Thus, if the United States aids the Pinochet regime in Chile and the Botha government in South Africa, this is not supporting international terrorism. On the other hand, aid to the ANC, or any other group *opposing* government is automatically aid to international terrorists. This is enormously helpful to Botha, Pinochet, and Reagan. On this system of definitions,

also, aid by Nicaragua to the rebels of El Salvador makes the rebels international terrorists and the Nicaraguan government a "terrorist state." Attacks on both are "counter-terrorism." On the other hand, U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government is exempt from any such labeling, even though it was massive killing by the U.S.-sponsored regimes in El Salvador that literally forced a guerrilla movement into existence in the early 1980s. As the West is generally trying to bolster up existing regimes against threats from below, a definitional system that renders all rebels and liberation movements terrorists by virtue of receiving aid, while not doing the same for aid to a government they are trying to unseat, is extremely convenient.

A problem arises, of course, where the West itself supports rebel movements and alleged "freedom fighters," as in the case of the Nicaraguan *contras* and Jonas Savimbi and the anti-government rebels in Angola. If the United States organizes and supports the *contras*, and South Africa (and the United States) do the same for Savimbi in Angola, strict adherence to the West's own skewed definitions makes the United States and South Africa "terrorist states." How is this handled? The answer is, once again, power defines terrorism: what we and our allies do cannot be terrorism, so that any incompatible definitions – even our own –



Carlos Calado

A machine-gunned ANC headquarters in Mozambique

must be temporarily abandoned and special exceptions made.⁹

The system of terrorism semantics

To summarize the Western definitional system and its consequences: If the Soviet Union gives aid to the PLO, it is supporting terrorism and is a terrorist state, because the

PLO uses force to oppose Israel. That intimidation is terrorism. If the United States gives aid to Israel, which invades Lebanon, imposes collective punishment on West Bank Arabs, and bombs Tunis and assorted other PLO "havens," this is not supporting terrorism because Israel only "retaliates" or engages in "counter-terrorism," as does the United

States. If the United States aids the Salvadoran government as it slaughters several thousand civilians a year, this is not support of terrorism because a state killing and torturing its own citizens is excluded from the western definition. Also, if some of the people being slaughtered are rebelling, they are "terrorists" and the allied government is slaughtering as "counter-terrorism" (as in Guatemala). If the United States organizes and aids the *contras*, and supports South Africa as the latter invades its neighbors and organizes subversive armies across its borders, this is not terrorism either because the victims are aiding "terrorists" (and we and our allies are again "countering" terror), or by a special exemption to the especially virtuous — who also happens to own the most guns and the biggest cash balance. ●

Edward S. Herman

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1. This usage is completely institutionalized in western discussions of terrorism. This is reflected, for example, in so-called "risk-assessment" analyses by professionals in that new field. Thus the U.S. consulting firm Risks International, Inc., confines terrorism entirely to dissident violence and excludes state murders by, say, Pinochet's government in Chile, by definition. In fact, in a recent assessment, it finds that the leading victim of terrorism in 1984 was the state of Chile *Executive Risk Assessment*, December 1985, p. 30.

2. The Tunis attack was of course directed at a PLO official residence. We may ask, however, whether it, immediately following the Beirut massacres of Palestinians, the PLO had successfully attacked the building of the Israeli Parliament, killing dozens of Israeli officials, this would have been considered legitimate targeting and "retaliation." And if not, why not?

3. What makes this system of words especially inappropriate is that Israel has gone to great pains to designate the PLO

as "terrorist" in order not to have to deal with the Palestinians, except as a group to marginalize and exterminate. For a discussion of the fact that the Israeli government invaded Lebanon in 1982 to avoid the threat of political negotiations, claiming, of course, that they were cleaning out nests of "terrorists," see Noan Chomsky, "Libya in U.S. Demonology." The U.S. media swallowed entirely the Israeli claim to be "retaliating" to "terrorism."

4. A significant proportion of hostages who have been killed have been victims of state efforts to recover the hostages by force. Those so killed are usually attributed to the dissident terrorists.

5. Another Orwellism may be noted here: State terrorists don't engage in terrorism, they violate "human rights"; only retail terrorists "terrorize."

6. For example, the PLO's status has been greatly reduced in the 1980s, because while massive Israeli attacks on its infrastructure has aroused no serious western recriminations at Israeli terrorism, and as each PLO attack is

"terrorism" it suffers a steady accumulation of moral deficits.

7. In an interview with the Johannesburg *Financial Mail*, November 18, 1983, Charles Lichenstein, the Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. stated that "destabilization will remain in force until Angola and Mozambique do not permit their territory to be used by terrorists (sic) to attack South Africa."

8. In 1985 the Reagan administration requested \$5 million for the Guatemalan police and security assistance as part of what it called a "counterterrorism" package.

9. There are, of course, rationalizations for the special exceptions. As Chester Crocker explained in regard to Angola, its government is illegitimate because it was put in place by a foreign (Soviet) power. (See *Namibia and Regional Destabilization in Southern Africa*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 15, 1983, p. 43.) Only if a government is put in place by us, or meets our approval, are attacks on it by rebels terrorism.

Minorities/Latino Workers

The Necessary Enemy Within

The North American Congress took 15 years to pass an immigration reform law. But the law does not address the contradictions that still exist in relation to Latino immigrant workers in the U.S.

In the current period of economic crisis, the United States has an important contradiction with respect to Latino immigrant workers. On one hand, there is the economic and political necessity of the system to make use of immigrant labor for its own profit. On the other, and this is what causes the contradiction, is the racial, cultural, political and geo-

political challenge that will develop from a massive Latino immigration. The contradiction between these two factors is what explains why the U.S. government needed 15 years of controversial and heated debates in order to pass the Simpson Rodino Law, the goal of which is to "regain control of the border" with Mexico.

Because of the economic crisis, the falling rate of profit

and the increase in international competition, the economy is undergoing a process of restructuring. This involves: (a) a reduction in the cost of production and attendant downward pressures on wages and benefits; and (b) a simplification and internationalization of the production process. Inherent in this process is the need for larger numbers of unskilled workers.

Capitalists find the Latino immigrant work force, particularly the Mexican work force, to have many desirable characteristics. They are able to use Latino workers effectively in jobs that are unskilled, low-wage, high turnover, menial, and labor-intensive. Furthermore, the Latino workforce has neither legal nor trade union rights and is entirely flexible in terms of night shifts, overtime or weekend work. Therefore, the U.S. economy, far from reducing its reliance on the immigrant workers, has been increasing it.

This process of restructuring of the labor force means, on the one hand, that there is an increase both in technical, specialized, well-paid work and in poorly paid unskilled work. Of course, this dual tendency occurs at the expense of semi-skilled work. In a special report about the changes that are occurring in the labor force, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that "many economists, social



National Geographic

Latino workers are concentrated in unskilled, low-wage jobs

scientists, business and labor leaders fear a trend toward a two-tiered society of haves and have-nots, skilled and unskilled, educated and illiterate."

Consequences of the high-tech process

The simplification of the work process through increasingly sophisticated high-tech machinery has been to the detriment of the skills of the individual worker, who had to pay for this gradual loss of control of the production process with reduced salaries and poorer working conditions.

In order to reduce wages, capital has three alternatives: (a) break or weaken unions; (b) move to regions in the U.S. and overseas in which cheap labor is plentiful and does not enjoy union rights; and/or (c) recruit "illegal" workers who, because of their own situation, accept whatever working conditions and wages they are offered.

Meanwhile, at the level of the economic system, the proportion of unskilled, poorly paid jobs being created is higher than that of skilled jobs. On the other hand, the educational, technical and professional level of the society as a whole is rising as are the wage expectations and social prestige of those who possess such skills. The downward pressure on wages, social factors that determine which jobs are acceptable to whom, and the rising skill level

of the U.S. population, help to explain at least in part, why the amount of immigration of undocumented workers continues to increase despite high unemployment. A restaurant owner complaining about his workers, said, "One of three workers who come into my restaurant can't make it to work on time. Getting them to work is a chore. Getting them there on time, in uniform and with a smile on their face is almost impossible. It's seen as a second-class job."

"Across the Sun Belt (the southern and western U.S.) the idea of life without illegals is almost as alarming as the thought of life without sunshine," noted the Wall Street Journal in regard to the presence of illegal immigrants. More important, President Ronald Reagan's Council of Economic Advisors recently noted that "immigration to the U.S. increases total employment and output in this

country as well as the per capita income of the native-born population. Immigrants provide a net fiscal benefit, using relatively fewer services and paying more taxes." Therefore, Mexicans are coming to the U.S. not just because they are "poor and hungry"¹ as the media say, but because they constitute an important link in the chain of production for the U.S. economy.

The observations by the Wall Street Journal and the Council of Economic Advisors are significant, considering that they constitute the first public acceptance by business sectors and conservative economists that undocumented immigrant workers represent a "net gain for the nation." This acceptance is important due to the fact that mass media and the government have historically publicized the idea that undocumented workers are "a burden on the country," an

Marion Trikosko



Despite unemployment, U.S. workers shun menial jobs



Immigrants represent a net gain for the U.S. economy

idea widely accepted by the great majority of U.S. citizens. In the fight for the rights of the undocumented workers this myth bears reexamining.

Several business groups such as the California Roundtable; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; the American Farm Bureau; Hotel, Restaurant and manufacturing business in the Southwest; the Heritage Foundation, as well as conservative economists, including the notorious Milton Friedman, accept the "net gain for the nation" concept and fear the passage of laws punishing businesses for hiring "illegal aliens."

The dividing lines

It is important to point out that the dividing lines over immigration reform are drawn differently from on any other political issue, so it is not unusual to find some strange alliances. Some conservative sectors are on the same side as Chicano-Latino and leftist

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organizations. In a conference on immigration organized by the University of California, Mike Garcia, a labor organizer representing the Service Employees International Union, commented, "I never imagined that I could be on the same side as the Heritage Foundation." Later the representative of the Heritage Foundation replied: "This is the first time that we agree with the American Civil Liberties Union."

But, as part of this same general contradiction between sometimes counterposed economic and political necessities, Mexican and Central American immigrants also serve as the ideal demons to exorcise in response to U.S. social and political problems.

Traditionally, the U.S. government, the labor union bureaucracy, racist and conservative policymakers, and organizations such as the Moral Majority, "U.S. English," Federation of American Immigration Re-

form (FAIR), Zero Population Growth, and Population-Environment Balance, Inc. have accused Mexican immigrants of causing unemployment and helping to lower the level of social and medical services for U.S. citizens.

To the extent that social, economic, and political problems in the United States have worsened, the number of organizations that address the problem of the "illegals" has increased. These groups attribute almost every problem to the presence of the undocumented. The following advertisement was placed in the April 13, 1986, *San Francisco Chronicle* and other local newspapers by Population-Environment Balance, Inc., formerly known as the Environmental Fund. "What do you think has caused our traffic jams? Our pollution? Increased crime? And higher taxes? Here's what: ... population growth. Most of the growth is due to immigration. And mostly illegal immigration."

In the 1986 election campaign, conservative candidates, mostly from California, linked "illegal aliens" to drug trafficking and terrorism. A television advertisement for Republican Senate candidate Mike Antonovich shows him standing on a bluff overlooking several hundred aliens massing on the other side of the border. The candidate goes on to say that "illegal immigration costs American taxpayers billions of



"The future of the people": Latinos are beginning to play an important role in U.S. politics

dollars a year, provides a conduit for drugs and may allow terrorists into the country."

These campaigns have had their desired effect of causing a collective hysteria against immigrant workers. This is reflected in the popular demand for restrictive immigration legislation. Gallup polls show that three quarters of the public support the Simpson-Rodino Law.

The political potential of Latino immigration

The Latino immigrant workforce presents a challenge in both the long and the short terms for those in power.

It represents a fundamental challenge to politically and ideologically racist U.S. institutions as well as for white U.S. citizens who are still impregnated with a strong racist ideology. The numerical growth of minorities, (brown, black, yellow) is a challenge to

this institutionally racist system. Because their numbers are growing at a faster rate than whites, they are in a better position to fight racism. Fear of this challenge is manifested by R.D. Mazzalli in his famous immigration reform proposal: "If the separation of language and culture exceeds a certain level, the unity and political stability of the nation, in time, would be seriously eroded. That unity comes from a common language and from a basic public culture formed by certain shared values, convictions and customs that makes us distinctly Americans."

Immigration is also a challenge to conservatism in the United States. Because they do not have any legal protection, new Latino immigrants continue to be easily manipulated and used to reactionary ends. However, once they become established in the U.S., they tend to become a liberal-progressive

political force partially in response to the previous manipulation.

There exist objective and real possibilities for a strong political and organizational alliance of racial minorities in which Latinos, given their increased strength racially, culturally, politically and numerically, can play an important role. The germs of this already exist in the "Rainbow Coalition" ² and in the alliance between the Latino and Black Caucus in the Congress or in local elections, such as in Chicago where minorities joined together to elect a black mayor. This is not to say that there are no conflicts between minority groups, but the trend is in the other direction.

Latinos also represent a challenge from a geopolitical point of view with respect to domestic and international policies. Domestically, Latinos are concentrated in the most important economic areas:

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New York, Chicago, and the Sun Belt, including the politically strategic and historically conservative Southwest. The increasing growth of the Latino population represents a threat and a challenge to the conservative forces. In the last election 75 percent of the Latinos voted for the more liberal Democratic Party.

A political obstacle

With respect to the international geopolitics, Latinos are concentrated in the area of the border between the United States and Latin

America. As conflicts between the United States and Latin America increase, Latinos constitute a more and more important political obstacle to the U.S. intervention in Latin America. The Sanctuary Movement⁹ illustrates this point.

Since Mexico and Central America are geographically apart of the U.S. "security system," the matter of immigration from these countries becomes a delicate political issue. It is in light of this fact that we must take seriously the declarations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Immigration and Naturalization

Service and right-wing organizations when they point out that "illegal aliens" represent a threat to the national security "greater than that of the Soviet Union." Reagan himself points out in this regard: "We have lost control of our borders, and no nation can do that and survive."

Therefore, the government and business are in a dilemma with respect to Latino immigrants. The government passed the Simpson Rodino Bill in response to the political pressure from public opinion, the labor bureaucracy, liberals and racist conservative organizations. On the other hand, the U.S. economy depends on Mexican immigrants as bread depends on yeast to rise.

From this perspective the Simpson-Rodino Law, far from solving the problems of "immigration," could further complicate them.

In order to present a viable solution to the immigration problem, the Simpson-Rodino Law would have to take into account the above mentioned economical and social transformations, but as we have seen before, the law is in direct contradiction to these changes. It is no more than an attempt to force a change in the disagreeable reality of having millions of unemployed where there is a scarcity of workers to perform menial labor. The law will distort this painful reality but not in favor of U.S. workers.



Steve Smith

An INS agent searches an illegal immigrant: "We have lost control of our borders," says Reagan



A Mexican held prisoner in the U.S.

Sanctions: the real control

The only real way to control immigration is through employer sanctions. The White House and Congress know this very well, but sanctioning employers also has its complications. If the law is enforced, sanctions would, in effect, be "a labor tax and in consequence a reduction of the production of goods and services," according to administration economic advisors. Therefore, a confrontation between business and government is to be expected, as is the continuing search for new ways to lower production costs. These will probably include an increase in

the number of businesses that move overseas in search of cheap labor force, the search for new labor-saving technologies, and an upsurge in attacks on organized labor and on the rights of workers in general. In this way the problem of "illegal aliens" would be resolved but not the conditions for which they are supposedly responsible.

If the law is not enforced for employers, but is enforced for undocumented workers, as has been the norm, we can expect a worsening of the situation. A law that is not a law invites illegality. The undocumented worker, being in a more vulnerable position legally, will further whet the

already voracious appetite of the employer. Therefore, the immigrant worker will have to pay an even higher price for the privilege of working in the U.S. "earthly paradise," but the issue will remain unresolved, creating more social tensions than it solves.

Very probably during the first years, the government will take the first option; after the initial hubbub subsides, they will opt for the second. Thus, in spite of the unfortunate reforms of immigration law, the ghosts of the "aliens", like wandering souls, will continue to haunt the skies of the capital.

Héctor Ramos

*Mexican journalist living
in the U.S.*

1. The Mexicans who cross the border are not the most economically desperate. In order to take the risk of coming to the United States, an immigrant must have at least one thousand dollars, which is difficult to accumulate, since the minimum wage in Mexico is only around US\$ 100 a month. These undocumented immigrants, having accumulated that much money, must then risk crossing the border at night through an inhospitable terrain.

2. The *Rainbow Coalition* is a group inside of the Democratic Party formed by minorities and white liberals and progressive workers and activists. One of their important goals is to fight for the civil and political rights of minorities. It is led by the Reverend Jesse Jackson who won 20 percent of Democratic votes in the 1984 Democratic Presidential primary elections.

3. The Sanctuary Movement was originally formed by church workers of all principal religious denominations to help and give refuge to the people of Central America who are fleeing from their countries due to civil war. The Reagan administration does not recognize these people as political refugees, preferring to call them "economic immigrants." Therefore, the Sanctuary Movement finds itself in a confrontation with the U.S. government. Currently there are more than 300 churches, 23 cities, the states of New Mexico and Wisconsin, and 13 universities which have publicly declared themselves as sanctuaries for Central American refugees.

Consumer Protection

Opting for the Poor

Latin America has joined a consumer movement that is rethinking its goals as a result of the influence of its Third World members.



João Farkas/isto é

Third World influence is changing the consumer movement

The consumer protection movement has made a fundamental change in direction since it emerged over 25 years ago. Founded in the wealthiest western countries by middle-class activists, the movement focused initially on product quality and prices. In time, it spread to the Third World — first to Asia, then to Latin America. But as it

expanded, the movement also began to take on a new form. Its new emphasis is on “opting for the poor,” an expression borrowed from the American religious movements which advocate support of the Catholic Church for the struggles of workers and peasants.

This change was reflected in the first Latin American

regional conference of the International Organization of Consumer Unions (IOCU), held late last year in Montevideo, Uruguay. Representatives of some 60 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from 17 Latin American countries attended. “Our principles have changed,” said Portuguese economist Lidia Barreiros, an adviser to the IOCU Board of Directors. Less emphasis is being placed on individual consumption, and more on community control over the way in which products are made, the use of natural resources and distribution net works.

The movement, which first emerged in 1960 under the leadership of a group of U.S. citizens, started by questioning monopolistic practices that ran counter to consumer interests. A decade later, according to a study made by German researchers Heiko Steffens and Gunter Rosenberger, the discussion shifted to “fundamental global issues, such as ecological preservation, the role of transnationals, and Third World problems.”

The study noted that the original aim of “helping people to get more value for their money” was replaced by “a wider concept of the general quality of life.”

Activists encouraged people “to think as critical consumers about the real need for the goods and services they were offered, as well as consumer rights and basic

social and economic conditions."

These notions evolved gradually as Third World consumer associations joined the movement. Particularly influential was the group from Penang, Malaysia, where an IOCU regional chapter has

been in operation since 1974. These organized consumers addressed such issues in Southeast Asia as the harmful effects of transnational advertising on local cultures, the influence of a "westernizing" model on traditional life styles, the

plundering of Third World natural resources, and destruction of the environment.

Did Latin American countries have their own views on these matters? The IOCU believed they did, and it dedicated the first work session to a study by Chilean

The Consumer Police

□ The International Police force for consumers, or "Interpol", is an IOCU program aimed at monitoring the deregulated global trade of dangerous products and technologies through the exchange of information between consumer associations in various countries and regions of the world.

The Interpol program pays special attention to the invasion of the Third World by large transnational corporations (TNCs) which sell products and technologies that have been banned in their countries of origin.

There is sufficient evidence that TNCs have consciously and deliberately exported to the Third World defective medical equipment, risky drugs, contaminated food products, deteriorated pesticides and other dangerous products.

Especially in countries where the consumer protection movement is in its infancy, the monitoring of products on the market cannot rely solely on state regulation, international norms conventions, or the hope that industries will behave properly.

Interpol provides an alternate means of checking the flow of dangerous products and technologies by informing consumers and the general public, as well as officials in importing countries, about the potential dangers of a given product or technology.

Formally founded at the IOCU's 10th

World Congress held in The Hague, Holland, in 1981, Interpol has its headquarters in the IOCU Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, based in Penang, Malaysia.

The IOCU system for handling charges and proposing responses is organized at three main levels: the Interpol coordinator, a jury made up of technicians and experts, and a network of representatives throughout the world, called "correspondents."

The latter systematically process information relative to known or newly detected dangerous products, and they issue calls of alarm and warnings on banned products, whether they are under observation or sold under restrictions in the market.

The information supplied by these correspondents is carefully evaluated and checked by the jury of technicians and experts. Depending on the gravity and magnitude of the danger involved, the Interpol coordinator will decide whether or not to alert consumers.

To date over 68 danger alerts have been issued to consumers on a wide range of products, including dangerous games, medicines, electrical products, food products, and pesticides.

At present the Interpol network includes over 60 correspondents in 40 developed countries and in the Third World, and is expected to grow both in numbers and in geographic coverage.

Interpol's address is: c/o IOCU, P. O. Box 1045, 10830 Penang, Malaysia.

economist Ricardo Lagos on "The Satisfaction of Basic Needs as a Developmental Strategy." The Pinochet dictatorship denied Lagos permission to go to Montevideo (which caused participants to file a firm protest with the Chilean embassy), but his paper was nevertheless presented by fellow economist Fabio Villalobos.

Lagos notes that four out of every ten Latin Americans are unable to afford essential goods and services and are therefore considered poor. Half of the region's inhabitants cannot meet even minimal needs for food and are considered destitute. Yet, unlike other Third World regions, Latin America has more than ample resources to meet the basic needs of its entire population. The prob-

Agência JB



The poverty gap can be closed

lem, he believes, lies in distribution.

Lagos argues that "the poverty gap - i.e., what the poor would have to have in order to cease being poor - is less than ten percent of the the Gross Domestic Product in eight out of ten Latin

American countries." Thus, "a strategy aimed at eliminating essential scarcities and putting an end to poverty in Latin America is perfectly feasible."

What the rich would have to give up in favor of the poor is really not much, say IOCU economists. The problem is that those social groups whose essential needs are not being met are the least politically organized. "The poor are also politically poor," says Barreiros.

For Lagos, "a strategy aimed at meeting essential needs should go beyond aid and promote a deep change in the region's style of development."

Until then, claim consumer activists, the poor will continue to pay more than the rich for the same goods. They lack access to credit and means



The poor pay more than the rich for the same goods

of transportation that would enable them to shop for more reasonable prices; their homes do not have shelf or large refrigerators that would enable them to buy in bulk, and the necessity to spend income immediately for basic needs prohibit them from saving up for a monthly trip to more economical large supermarkets.

In many Latin American countries, consumers are beginning to organize in order to meet their food, housing and health needs. At last year's conference, mention was made of the experiment launched by the Coalition of Montevideo Consumer Groups (CMCG), in which approximately 3,000 families are organized into 60 neighborhood groups which purchase essential goods. Using exclusively volunteer workers, the CMCG negotiates better prices directly with wholesalers. "This kind of consumer organization should set an example for all efforts aimed at meeting basic needs," said Barreiros in a workshop on poverty.

Also discussed during the conference were such traditional topics as anti-smoking campaigns, pharmaceutical products, and pesticides and other toxic products. Networks that reach throughout Latin America were created for the exchange of information and experiences with existing global networks in the areas of health and pharmaceuticals (Health Action International-HAI),



The anti-smoking campaign remains a topic of interest.

pesticides (Pesticide Action Network-Pan) and baby food (International Baby Food Action Network-IBFAN).

The Montevideo Declaration recognized "the diversity of the attending groups ... which reflects the variety of organizations promoting consumer interests." At the closing ceremony, controversies arose over the real meaning of the ongoing global economic crisis and the responses of Latin American consumers to such issues as inflation and the foreign debt.

Nevertheless, the document reflected the general agreement that "consumer protection has to do with more

general economic deficiencies, and involves more than the mere consumer-supplier bilateral relationship."


The conference decided to pressure governments to officially recognize consumer unions and accept them as "attending members in negotiations on matters that are of concern to them, such as the setting of wages and prices," along with business and labor union representatives.

The IOCU plans to establish regional headquarters for Latin America and the Caribbean in Montevideo in the near future.


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Acting out the Struggle

People's theater, an age-old weapon of oppressed classes in Bangladesh, is being rediscovered by a theater group working with landless peasants.

People's theater has a long history as a battleground in the struggle between the dominant and subordinate classes in Bangladesh. Today that tradition is being rediscovered, not only in Asia but throughout the Third World, as a weapon in struggles for land, better working and living conditions, women's rights and other basic rights. In Bangladesh, one of the groups using this weapon is Aranyak, a middle class theater group that is applying lessons it learned from the landless laborers themselves.

For the oppressed group in society, people's theater refers to the theater of the popular classes (that is, dealing with issues and concerns of peasants and workers) created and performed by the people for audiences of peasants and workers. "Of the people" conveys the Brechtian sense of advancing the interests of the popular classes.

One must, of course, not exaggerate the transformative potential of theater. Orga-

nizing struggle on the stage is different from doing it in real life and the distinction must not be blurred. Theater must be linked with organizing and struggle. Where these conditions are met, the performance itself can become a form of struggle. For example some of the organizations of landless laborers in Bangladesh have sufficient organizational strength to openly challenge

the landlords. The means they've chosen to do this is to dramatize in a public forum the landlords' acts of injustice and corruption.

A brief history

In Bengal, the region encompassed by the national boundaries of Bangladesh, people's theater has for centuries contributed to the battles against foreign domination and hierarchical structural relationships. It has not only reflected the struggles between the dominant castes (Brahmins and Khotriyas) and classes (feudal overlords, foreign invaders, bourgeoisie) and the subordinate castes (Boishyas and Shudras) and classes (middlemen, peasants, artisans, landless laborers) but also has served as a weapon in this struggle — as a means of



Peasant women: actors in their own theater



Today's popular theater keeps alive a tradition

reinforcing the domination of the ruling classes or as a tool of challenging their exploitation and rallying popular struggle against oppression.

In pre-thirteenth century Bengal the mythological dramas which had their origins in the *puranic* epics (Ramayana and Mahabharata) tended to reinforce the feudal status quo and the Brahmanic hegemony. By showing the importance and heroism of the gods they taught deference to the feudal overlords and acceptance of the overlord's right to the surplus from the peasants' labor. They also reinforced belief in a supernatural order which controlled the world, including acceptance of a fatalistic and submissive approach to the world. The dramas rarely challenged the feudal power structure and where they did this was a type of "overturning" necessary for the

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preservation of the system.

In the thirteenth century, during the short rule of the South Indian Vaisnava Sena kings, a new form of people's resistance "theater" emerged to challenge the caste hierarchy of Brahmanical law. This movement, characterized by songs and dances condemning the hypocrisy and decadence of the system, represented the upsurge of popular classes against the social discrimination and economic exploitation of the Brahmanic system.

In the fourteenth century, with the coming of the Moslems, mass conversions took place, the language of the courts changed to Persian, and taxes were increased. The movement continued to grow, and the songs and dances expressed both defiance against the foreign rulers and resistance against the Brahmanic order.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century, with the arrival of the British and the introduction of western education, there was a brief period of "cultural renaissance." Once the Bengali educated elite began to see that their interests could not be accommodated by colonialism, they began to resist colonial rule. The new forms of urban theater learned from the colonizers became a powerful tool for protest.

In the 1900s these spontaneous outbursts of anti-colonial protest culminated in a more sustained nationalist struggle. The "traditional" theater of the villages became a symbol for the struggle, and the Bengali elite who had previously ignored or denigrated traditional theater began to revalue it. Indian Poet Rabindranath Tagore and others appropriated these arts and advocated their use in programs of cultural revival and anti-colonial protest within the context of rural fairs and festivals.

In the 1940s all this activity culminated in the creation of a popular theater movement, the Indian People's Theatre Association (IPTA), which operated all over India but had its strongest contingent in Bengal. Its initial work was to alert people to the possibility of Japanese invasion and to promote temporary support for Britain's war effort. In 1943 during the Bengal famine in which five million peasants starved to death, the Bengal

IPTA troupe performed all over India with a play exposing the native hoarders and black marketeers, raising over 200,000 rupees and launching a campaign to "Save People's Food."

In 1947, with the departure of the British and the end of the colonial regime, the Indian subcontinent was divided into India and Pakistan. East Bengal, whose population is primarily Moslem, became part of Pakistan, and their links with IPTA dissolved. When the Punjabi bureaucracy and military of West Pakistan became the dominant force in the new state and imposed Urdu as the national language, a bitter revolt erupted. This took the form of a "language movement" in which songs and dramas played a primary role in stirring up nationalist feelings. The cultural work was so effective that many of the playwrights and actors were arrested. One of the playwrights, Munir Chowdhury, wrote his most famous play, *Kabor* (Graveyard), while he was in prison. Along with other prisoners he performed it right in jail.

The nationalist struggle in the 50s and 60s and continuing victimization by Pakistan's military rulers culminated in the War of Liberation in 1971 (which originated today's Bangladesh), in which songs and drama played a mobilizing role.

During this period (1950-1970) in the villages the peripathetic theater – the *jatra*,

kobigan, *jarigan* and other "traditional" theaters – began to undergo a transformation. As capital increasingly penetrated the villages, theater became more of a commodity. Traditional performers who formerly combined work in the fields with part-time work as performers stopped performing altogether or became employed on a full-time commercial basis. *Jatra* groups which formerly operated under the sponsorship of a *zamindar* or plantation owner began to do their tours on a commercial basis, working out contracts with the landlords in each village.

Aranyak: Performing for the people

Aranyak was founded soon after Bangladesh's independence (December 1971) by a group of middle-class youth who had been deeply affected by their experience in the liberation war. Along with the

peasants and workers they had hoped that the liberation war would lead to a true revolution, one in which the land would be redistributed, other feudal structures transformed, and Bangladesh's economy taken over by the people of Bangladesh. When they saw their hopes were futile, that the rural structures remained intact, the economy still under foreign control, and a small comprador class monopolizing the benefits of independence, they decided to do something about this betrayal of the people's hopes and to fight for change.

The vehicle they chose for their political challenge was theater and they initially looked to Calcutta's group theater for their ideas and inspiration. They formed an amateur group made up of about thirty people, most of whom worked in other jobs during the day in school-teaching, banks, offices, and factories. They came together each evening or on



At first, Aranyak performed for peasant spectators

weekends to rehearse or to give performances.

During the seventies they concentrated on producing one major theatrical work a year, all of them on political themes and performed in urban areas. While these performances succeeded in theatrical terms, they failed to have the desired political impact. Their audiences, which largely consisted of urban, middle-class people, reacted emotionally to the plays, but once these were over, their commitment to social action died. The praise of theater critics, the publication of scripts, the invitation to do TV work were no measure of success. In fact, the lack of resistance to their work by the ruling class was a clear indication of its limited effectiveness. Their work was becoming, they felt, absorbed by the system and their protest muted.

So they decided to change their audience and turn to the rural peasants who make up 90 percent of Bangladesh's population. They took their plays to the rural areas. Thousands of people turned up for these performances, but despite the enthusiastic reception the new approach seemed equally problematic.

Performing *for* the people represented the old politics – urban-based left-wing groups preaching revolt to the masses, a kind of political pamphleteering, of manipulating people with slogans and lectures. It had little effect and demonstrated no potential to

mobilize people to build a self-reliant and critically conscious popular movement.

Making a change: Getting the people to do the acting and the thinking

Around this time Aranyak made contact with Proshika, a Bangladeshi rural animation organization. Proshika's animators, who are permanently based in the villages, work with the landless laborers in a process of popular education and organizing. In each village they form groups of 15-20 landless laborers who meet regularly, build up trust in each other, eliminate conflicts among themselves, overcome dependence on the money-lender (through collective savings), talk about their problems of exploitation and victimization, and along with other groups organize struggles to confront injustice and corruption by the landlords and to demand better working conditions.

In their residential training programs, Proshika regularly uses role-playing and socio-drama. Participants from one session in 1978 decided to perform the socio-drama in their village and later to landless peasants. Proshika immediately recognized the potential of this educational and organizing tool which the landless themselves had demonstrated and after further experimentation organized a national workshop to promote the new activity.

It adapted a training approach developed in

Botswana whose basic notion was that theater for social animation should be learned not as an abstract concept but as a practical process grounded in a specific social context. In the Bangladesh situation this meant sending the workshop participants in teams to villages where they met with the group of landless laborers which Proshika had organized.

One of the real discoveries of the workshop was the power of the landless laborers' own stories. There was no need to fictionalize. Most of the plays were drawn from their *real* experiences. Another discovery was the amazing acting ability of the landless. Their performance as actors overwhelmed the middle-class cultural workers of the Proshika group. They had come thinking they had something to teach the landless; by the end of the workshop they felt that, if anything, it was they who had learned.

From performing to animation

Aranyak was equally impressed by the workshop, and when a second workshop was held in 1981, one of Aranyak's members helped to organize it. They immediately recognized this new approach as the breakthrough they were hoping for. Getting the landless laborers to do the dramas transformed the whole process: the laborers doing the "acting" were taking the first awareness-raising and confi-

dence-building step toward real action.

Aranyak abandoned its role as performers and began to work *with* rather than *for* the rural poor. They stopped imposing their own image of the landless laborer's world and encouraged the laborers to create their own stories and dramas. They saw their work, in the way Augusto Boal does in his "theater of the oppressed," as encouraging the laborers to re-appropriate the theater which had been stolen from them.

Aranyak's role was no longer to sing the songs for the people and keep them quiet. Their work was to show the peasants that they could act, that they could express themselves and enjoy themselves through making drama, that they could analyze their life-situation through this medium, and that it could be used as a weapon in their struggle against oppression and victimization.

Aranyak's animation work gradually took a different direction than Proshika's. They run brief, 10- to 12-day workshops with groups of landless in an effort to form drama groups. In the short-term the aim is to get these groups operating on their own without an over-dependence on Aranyak. Their long-term aim is to facilitate the development of a national movement of landless drama groups.

The Aranyak team normally consists of five members - four animators



The people express themselves

and a coordinator - assigned to different villages within the same area. Each animator moves into a village and works with the landless in their own social situation - staying with them, joining them in their periods of leisure, and eating with them. The workshops go through the following stages in a gradual process:

1. Establishing a base in the village.
2. Winning the landless' confidence.
3. Listening to the landless' problems.
4. Analyzing these problems and making a scenario
5. Improvising, analyzing, making changes.
6. Community performance.
7. Post-performance discussions.
8. Follow-up and evaluation.

The initial obstacle is the landlords, who resort to

everything from amiable hospitality to physical violence in order to undermine the group's work. Interestingly, once they begin performing, the landless love playing the oppressor and have great insight into his character and motivation. Once they get over the initial fear of being victimized, they portray him with great satire, bringing out all his mannerisms and idiosyncrasies.

In the end, the most significant impact of the group's work is the change in people's consciousness. Before the workshops many of the landless were resigned to their situation, explaining their impoverishment as the result of bad luck or the will of Allah. They saw no contradiction in their society. They were on the whole passive and skeptical about making changes in their lives.

At present, Aranyak realizes that to make any significant impact the group needs to sustain an animation program for ten years or more. At the same time they recognize the real dangers and obstacles that lie ahead, including the victimization and repression of cultural groups. Finally, the links between the village-based work and the bigger social and political events of the country remain to be worked out. ●

**Ross Kidd and
Mamunur Rashid**

*(Condensed from
Bulletin of Concerted Asian
Scholars)*

Third World Books

IN THE NAME OF PROGRESS

Patricia Adams and Lawrence Solomon
Energy Probe, Canada, 1986



The book is a clear-eyed look at the consequences of foreign aid. Too often it has damaged the subsistence way of life of Third World peoples, especially indigenous peoples. This has occurred not only because foreign aid is provided on the condition that the beneficiaries buy First World technology, but also because governments of rich countries in the West share one economic faith: a belief in large-scale industry and technology. The authors challenge commonly held myths about energy and progress in today's world, and propose alternate ways for the future. More importantly, they raise the question of what it means to be fully human in a technological, industrial age.

TEMPLES OR TOMBS?

Centre for Science and Environment, India, 1985

The book gives a blow-by-blow account of three environmental controversies that have become milestones in the debate on "environment versus development" in India. It highlights the political issues involved and the profiles of personalities in these conflicts, the enormous expectations raised by the projects and the disillusionment that results.



Yesterday's "temples" of progress turn out to be today's tombs: from symbols of promise to marks of wanton destruction. The study is based on painstaking research and interviews.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DISEASE

Cedric De Beer
Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), London, 1986

The author looks into South

African health conditions in the context of apartheid, arguing that the country's health problems, especially those of the black population, are directly related to the unevenness of the local income distribution. De Beer divided his study into five analyses of special cases, among which the incidence of tuberculosis in the bantustans and urban black neighborhoods. He contrasts this situation with health services offered to whites – a class enjoying the living standards of a developed country while epidemics are rampant in black areas. De Beer concedes that his study should go further to include the issue of women's health, the impact of transnational pharmaceutical industries and the issue of degenerative diseases among the white population. Yet the cases discussed in detail in his book suffice to convince the reader that South African health, hospital and medical conditions can improve only with the end of apartheid and social injustices.

THE SURPLUS PEOPLE

Laurine Platzky and
Cherryl Walker
Ravan Press, Capetown, 1984

This book is a condensation of a five-volume study published last year by the two authors as the result of a three-year survey, involving over 50 researchers under the sponsorship of the Surplus People Project, of the problem of forced removals of black populations from areas which the apartheid regime has reserved for whites.

The survey is undoubtedly the most complete and profound study ever conducted on the problem of mass transfers of black families to gov-

ernment-created reservations or communities in distant areas lacking the bare necessities for decent human living. Over three million blacks have been thus forcibly removed in the past five years, while another million and a half may follow in 1986-87.

The policy of forced removals is now one of the most critical issues in an increasingly radical confrontation between the 24 million blacks and a white minority of 4 million in South Africa, and has found its most outspoken opponent in the United Democratic Front (UDF), the country's largest antiapartheid organization.

THE TRADE IN BODIES

Catholic Institute for
International Relations (CIIR),
London, 1986

The Philippines today is a leading Asian exporter of nurses, seamen and doctors, and its economy is largely sustained by the foreign exchange earnings they send home. This book looks at how Filipinos become migrant workers and the exploitation to which they are exposed. It surveys the plight of Filipino migrants in the Middle East, Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific region, and assesses the economic significance of the migrant labor system.

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Peruvian Amazon: Coke is it!

The cocaine industry is taking over the Peruvian Amazon. The cultivation for export of the sacred leaf of the Incas is destroying the economic and social fabric of the region.



Aldo Martinez / Manchete

Before and after: the sacred leaf and the drug

In May 1982, the Investigative Commission on Narcotics Trafficking of the Peruvian Senate (which included several prominent public figures) made public its

findings: the problem of cocaine and narcotics trafficking is not simply a criminal problem to be handled by the police. It is a structural one which hits, with

devastating impact, the entire structure of society and its value system.

The same report underlined and reaffirmed something that, today, nobody disputes: that the real problem of narcotics trafficking is outside rather than inside the country. It stated that the "crux of the matter is that narcotics trafficking cannot be confronted, treated and solved by internal actions alone." To combat drug trafficking by relying on the infrastructure, manpower and arms of police institutions, and by investing in repressive mechanisms, would be useless if not accompanied by the cooperation of other countries, the report states.

The coca leaf has a long history in Peru, but never has its traditional consumption had the repercussions that the current refined product is having. The final product, cocaine in powder, uses but 10 percent of the content of the sacred leaf of the Inca culture. Other medical or nutritional properties of the leaf are ignored as it is processed first into paste and then into powder.

The recent demand created by five million North American cocaine users has led to the dizzying expansion of cocaine cultivation and the production of cocaine paste. Edmundo del Aguila, an expert on the subject, estimates that the amount of land dedicated to cocaine in Alto Huallaga in 1965 amounted to only 3,000

hectares. (It is in Alto Huallaga where Peru's highest quality cocaine is produced. Measured by alkaline content, the region's product has a value of 9.8 as opposed to an average of 4.6 in the rest of the country.)

In 1980, as stated in the Senate report, 17,862 hectares were dedicated legally to cocaine cultivation, and illegal cultivation accounted for another 50,000 hectares. In Alto Huallaga, there were a suspected 10,000 hectares illegally producing cocaine. In 1986, according to statements made by leaders of the Front in Defense of the Interests of the People of Tocache (FEDIP), illegal cultivation in Alto Huallaga alone utilized more than 195,000 hectares. This geometric increase in the amount of land under cocaine cultivation demonstrates two things: first, that the means employed to date to limit, control and eradicate cocaine production and promote substitute crops have been ineffective given the strong demand in the market, and secondly, that there is no solution in sight for producer countries like Peru and Bolivia.

In order to combat narcotics trafficking, Peru has not only passed ad hoc legislation, but it has also introduced specialized police units like the Mobile Unit of the Rural Patrol (UMOPAR) and designed programs to control and eradicate cocaine plantations and encourage the

cultivation of substitute crops. Examples of such programs are the Special Alto Huallaga Project, the Control and Reduction of Cocaine Cultivation in Alto Huallaga Program (CORAH), and the National Cocaine Company (ENACO). This cumbersome and slow-moving bureaucratic apparatus has not only a high economic cost, but it also has a high cost in terms of human lives: several civilian officials and police officers have died in the war against cocaine and drug trafficking.


The limited benefits of this battle in no way compensate for the high material and human costs. CORAH, for example, began operations in Alto Huallaga in May 1983, but its army of 1,000 workers has managed to eradicate just 620 hectares. One reason for

CORAH's disappointing results is a loophole that appeared despite the careful planning of government officials. For each hectare that is eradicated, CORAH provides an indemnity of US\$ 400. With 200 of those dollars, which are provided in good faith by the North American government, the cocaine producer can open a new small farm and continue producing. As in the fiction of Borges, a vicious circle begins to forever repeat itself.

The "Tocachization" of the Selva Alta

When the press publishes statistics on the numbers of airplanes and amounts of drugs captured, or the numbers of killings, it appears to be an academic exercise. Inside Peru

Toni Comith / Gamma



Cocaine production in the jungle

- a country plagued by geographic, social and cultural disarticulation - this war seems distant and remote.

But in fact it is far from remote. Like the violence unleashed by the situation involving Sendero Luminoso, the drug war threatens to infect the entire Peruvian jungle region known as the Selva Alta - if not the whole Amazon region. This phenomenon has political, economic and social implications: it is leading to something called the "Tocachization" of the region - the term being derived from the name of a town hard hit by the effects of the cocaine economy.

This process has had a disruptive effect on agriculture in the Selva Alta. The expansion of cocaine cultivation is leading to the disintegration of the region's entire economy. Not only is cocaine planted on marginal lands, hillsides and inaccessible mountain areas, but it is also overtaking the valley flatlands of Huallaga Central, Bajo Mayo and Bajo Huallaga.

Ironically, the type of crop substitution occurring in the Selva Alta runs directly counter to the intent of government programs: cocaine is replacing food and commercial crops. The dire consequences of this substitution include ecological devastation: land planted in cocaine is being irreversibly depleted due to poor soil management.

This "backwards substitution" is a response to the high price of cocaine, which has been driven up by the North American demand. The price for 25 pounds (about 13 kilograms) of cocaine in the Selva Alta is 400 intis,* while the government through ENACO pays an official price of 85 intis. The rest falls somewhere in between.

One effect of the high prices is uncontrolled inflation, especially for consumer goods. Another factor contributing to inflation is the increasing tendency to "dollarize" the region's economy - this as a result of the high level of demand created by drug traffickers. For the average consumer, the result is that a chicken that would normally sell for 50 or 60 intis in the towns of Moyobamba or Rioja, goes for 150 to 200 intis in the Cocaine Triangle of Uchiza, Tocache and Pachiza - three towns in Alto Huallaga. Another result is that shortages of various goods are beginning to be a daily occurrence.

Salaries are also being "Tocachized." According to law, the average salary in the towns of Tarapoto, Rioja, Moyobamba or Nuevo Cajamarca is between 35 and 40 intis per day - the minimum necessary to get by. On the other hand, a farmworker harvesting cocaine in Alto Huallaga, paid on a piecework basis, can earn 300 to 400 intis a day. This is leading to a massive influx of workers into the Cocaine Triangle, leaving nearby areas

with a shortage of manpower. César Villanueva Arévalo, director of the Center for Development and Investigation of the Selva Alta (CEDISA), based in Tarapoto, estimates that an average of 20 percent of the residents of rural villages in the Selva Alta are employed in cocaine-related jobs. This is made even worse by the fact that the total population of San Martín exceeds 300,000 and 70 percent of the population lives in rural areas.

But the effects of the drug industry reach beyond the economy. They also touch the entire social and cultural structure of the region. Narcotics trafficking is like a cancer running through the fabric of an otherwise healthy society, producing corruption, degradation and violence. The war against drug trafficking has claimed many victims, such as the 15 civil guards of UMPAR who were killed in July 1986. Police statistics show that an average of 38 killings a month take place in Alto Huallaga, and this excludes the victims dumped at the bottom of the rivers - victims who take with them the secrets of their deaths.

The local population is being affected in another way. Until a few years ago, the Peruvian Amazon was but a production and transport area for drugs headed for Colombia and the United States. But it has been transformed into an area of consumption. Recently the police in Iquitos noted that between January and the

1881 - February 1987

beginning of June 1986, almost 4,000 drug users had been detained. The difference is that unlike in other countries, in the Peruvian Amazon these drug users are recruited from the popular sectors of society.

Nothing slows narcotics trafficking and its destructive side-effects. In 1981, 40 percent of the regional economy of the Peruvian Amazon was based on drug trafficking — making it, after petroleum, the area's second most important industry. There are no indications that its impact has diminished. Conversely, the "Tocachi-zation" advances.

Therefore, the hour has arrived to confront the problem with the same



Cuncha Cubero / NACLA

Street vendors selling the coca leaf

weapons of capitalism and a cold-bloodedness equal to that of the market. The solution is a political one, and it is daring, realistic and imaginative. The proposal is to sell all the coca leaves that Peru produces to

the United States. They will know what to do with the sacred leaf. ●

Roger Rumrill

* In December 1986, the official exchange rate was 13.98 intis per U.S. dollar.

3 THIRD WORLD BOOK REVIEW

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THIRD WORLD BOOK REVIEW. Kwame Nkrumah House, 173 Old Street, London EC1V 9NJ.

Full Nets and Empty Stomachs

Third World countries are catching more of the world's fish, but the product still winds-up on the tables of Northern consumers.



Ten of the world's top 15 sea food-producing countries are of the Third World, and the region's market share is increasing. It is now responsible for half of the global catch, up from 27 percent in 1952.

This would seem to be good news, but it is not being received as such by the region's poor—especially since they are not receiving the fish. In Latin America, for example, the theoretical per capita consumption should be 28 kilograms annually, judging by production figures.

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However, per capita consumption remains at a miniscule eight kg.

The "missing" 20 kilograms are exported directly or processed into industrial products, fish meal and fish oil for export. Of the 84 million tons of fish now caught annually, 20 million tons are turned into meal for animal feed and another 10 million tons are wasted, according to the magazine *International Agricultural Development*. Even more disturbing is the recent trend in the annual catch, which is growing at less than one percent

Special/Fishing

**Brazilian women
sort lobsters destined
for export.**



R. N. Económico

a year – and decreasing sharply in many regions.

Ironically, fish products represent a higher proportion of animal protein consumption in the Third World – even though inhabitants of poorer countries eat less fish per capita than their more fortunate counterparts in industrial countries. In some regions, fish protein represents 40 percent of the animal protein ingested. Of the 40 countries most dependent on sea food as a source of protein, 39 are of the Third World.

The increase in the market share of Third World countries was given a boost by the imposition of the 200 mile fishing limit, recognized officially in 1982 by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Many countries had unilaterally imposed the wider limit in the mid-1970s, and as a result, Third World catches began to show marked increases after 1979. Between 1981 and 1982, for example, the South's share of global exports in financial terms jumped from 40 to 44 percent. "Increasingly, fishing is being conducted by domestic fleets in domestic waters," concludes a report by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The change has brought increased export earnings, but while the coffers of some Third World governments are a little fuller, the same cannot necessarily be said of the stomachs of the region's undernourished poor.

Korea, Mexico and Chile rank among the world's leading exporters, and in Senegal, a major exporter on the West African coastline, the national press has proclaimed fish as the

"blue oil of Senegal – the first sector of the economy with 20 percent of export earnings." These fish are almost always destined for the industrialized North. Only one Third World country, Nigeria, imports significant amounts of fish, although a few countries like Senegal and Egypt have entered into South-South exchange agreements.

Luxury products for the North

For the most part, poor countries export luxury products with high added values, like tuna and shrimp. Since other types of fish are generally consumed locally, there would appear to be little conflict between the international and local markets. However, this is misleading, particularly in the case of shrimp. Given destructive modern techniques, shrimp fishing has wreaked havoc upon local catches. For each kilogram of shrimp recovered from the sea, five kilograms of fish are destroyed.

The French newsletter *El Correo de Solagrál* described how France relies on the Third World for a significant portion of its sea food. The world's third largest maritime power for its size, France ranks number three in imports of marine products. In 1983, its trade deficit in this area reached 5.5 million francs. Among the primary suppliers for the French market are

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Senegal and Morocco.

Shrimp, salmon and tuna top the list of French imports. In 1983, over 40 percent of its imported shrimp came from tropical regions. Significant amounts of tuna were purchased from the Ivory Coast, Venezuela, Mexico and South Africa, as well as Senegal. At the same time, the tuna hauled in by French vessels comes almost exclusively from African waters or the Indian Ocean. France's fish meal imports vary between 50,000 and 60,000 tons a year, of which 20 percent is purchased from the Third World.

Moreover, the fish meal that Third World countries export is processed from fish that is often edible. Chile, for example, processes 93 percent of its national catch into fish meal. Globally, scraps and leftovers represent but a small fraction of the 20 million tons converted annually into meal. The rest is made from fish that could be consumed by humans.

Fish meal often winds up being fed to cattle, and it indirectly finds its way into the human food chain. However, petfood companies are beginning to lay claim to an increasingly large proportion of the catch. For example, the Australian petfood producer Uncle Ben's is now using "sharply" more fish in its products, according to the trade publication *Australian Fisheries*. In 1983, Uncle Ben's processed 4,300 tons of fish for petfood. In 1986, it expected to process 13,000 tons of mostly local fish. And Uncle Ben's uses only quality fish, boast company executives. "Cats are extraordinarily sensitive when it comes to selecting their food," said one official.

An essential source of protein

Sea food provides 24 percent of the world's animal protein and six percent of all proteins consumed. In general, fish plays a more important role in the Third World, particularly in Africa and Asia – although huge variations exist between regions and countries. The world's fish eating crown goes to the Pacific islanders of Vanuatu who devour 76.5 kilos a 90 – third world


year – nearly one and a half kilos per person each week. In the Caribbean, figures range from 41 kilos in Grenada to 10 in Trinidad. In East Africa, Tanzanians consume 15.5 kilos a year while in nearby Kenya they eat just 2.7. Ethiopians consume 0.8 kilos, and the peoples of some landlocked countries, like Swaziland, eat so little fish that their consumption figures are recorded statistically as zero.

Taking into account expected economic growth, the world's sea food needs will reach 100 million tons annually in the year 2000, according to estimates of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). This would represent nearly a 100 percent increase in production compared with 1982, when human consumption stood at 53 million tons. The FAO estimates that annual investments of US\$ 1.5 billion in fisheries could raise the world catch to 130 million tons within 20 years and that the ultimate potential annual catch could reach 400 million tons.

However recent trends seem to contradict these generally optimistic forecasts. The fishing industry is characterized by stagnation, particularly in Asia and Africa. Catches in Senegal, one of the world's leading consumers and exporters of fish, dropped from 340,000 tons in 1975 to 210,000 in 1981-82 – despite the fact that its exports increased over the same period. In Asia, many of the leading sea food-producing countries are losing ground. Catches are down in India; China has exhibited a decline despite a slight recovery in 1982, and Thailand is suffering considerable decreases.

One of the probable causes for this decrease is the overexploitation of certain species of fish. For example, the optimal catch for a particular type of tuna is about 110,000 tons, but overfishing netted 143,000 tons in 1981 and 120,000 the following year. More than half of the fish were undersized, so the industry resorted to more sophisticated methods – including poaching. In 1983, for example, several French ships were captured while fishing illegally in the waters of Guinea.

Special/Fishing



Small-scale fishers are threatened by industrial trawlers

Industrial vs. small-scale fishing

Large industrial trawlers, whether foreign or domestic, are eating into the catches of small-scale local fishers who, according to World Bank figures, supply 90 percent of the fish eaten by Third World peoples. Organizations of small-scale fishers complain that industrial fleets are overfishing in near-shore waters with their large dragnets and that less fish are available for the local catch. The trawlers, say the artisanal fishers, are damaging spawning and feeding grounds and thus threatening the very livelihood of the small-scale fisher.

If it is possible to rigorously administer world reserves, it does not seem impossible to reach the 100 million tons that the FAO says will be necessary in the year 2000. However, researcher Joseph Klatzmann maintains that, given population growth, this increase will only allow consumption to continue at current levels. "You cannot expect, then, that fishing will solve, nor will it contribute to the resolution of, the problem of providing animal protein for human consumption," Klatzmann noted in a 1983 report.

Increases in human consumption are, however, possible. One step in this direction would be to reduce the devastating effects of industrial fishing. One specific suggestion is to limit the production of fish meal to scraps and those species which are not fit for human consumption; another is to introduce rational management of shrimp fishing. These two measures would lead to an estimated increase in catches of 25 million tons annually, according to an article by Alain Le Sann in *El Correo de Senegal*.

Since small-scale fishers provide the bulk of the fish eaten in the Third World, they deserve special attention. The FAO recognized this in 1984 when it shifted its emphasis away from the promotion of industrial fishing in order to focus on assistance for artisanal fishers. Specifically, the FAO maintains that small-scale fishers need technical assistance and credit. In addition, it estimates that simple measures to improve preservation techniques (such as facilities to keep catches on ice) would save four million tons of fish that are lost each year because they go bad or become infected with insects.

●
Bill Hinchberger

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Reeling in a Decent Living

Small-scale fishermen and women have often lost out in "fisheries development." Now they are organizing.

In most Third World countries today there is growing awareness about the central role to be played by fish-workers in planning and implementing fisheries development policies and programs. These fishworkers include the men, women and children engaged in small-scale fishing and also crew members, processing workers and sellers. Their wish for a say in how fisheries are run comes from concern and frustration about their deteriorating socio-economic conditions.

Small-scale, artisanal fishermen in developing countries are today the largest segment of the class of fishworkers, numbering between 15-20 million. Dispersed along coastal and river areas, they harvest a quarter of the world's fish catch in their pursuit of a livelihood.

Their harvest provides the fish supply of local, rural consumers; it may also find its way to the homes of elite New Yorkers and posh Tokyo restaurants. Despite their importance as food producers, fishworkers the world over share the common fate of having to survive on a quality of life that is often far below that of the other citizens in their respective countries.

The cause of their poverty arose initially from a low asset position – particularly the lack of sufficient fishing gear – leading in turn to low productivity. Small fishermen harvest on the average only between 2-3 tons of fish a year.

Added to this, their near total lack of control over the disposal of the produce of their hard labor resulted in unfair prices yielding low

incomes leading to indebtedness and total dependence on merchant-financiers. The only saving grace in their vicious poverty circle was that "free access" to the "unlimited" sea always held out the prospect of a bumper harvest. This helped to keep hopes alive.

With the onset of the "development decades" many governments of developing countries opted for the path of modernization as the answer to the sordid plight of small-scale fishermen. Traditional technology, accumulated knowledge of the sea and fishing, socio-economic forms and the conservation ethic were considered barriers to development and so totally discarded.

Abandoning the "small" in pursuit of larger scale operations was considered the logical path productivity was realized but at much higher costs of production and at levels of indebtedness often leading to a gradual loss of to economic growth. The technological artifacts of the West were taken to be the harbingers for alleviating all problems. Raising production and productivity were seen to be the sole requisite to alleviate the fishermen's poverty.

"Spectrum of results"

Substantial finances were mobilized and investments made on modernization programs. An evaluation of their impact on the socio-economic condition of small-scale fishermen in the developing world yield a spectrum of results.

The enhanced level of technology created a "technological dualism" in the fish economy. Only a small minority – not necessarily fishermen – had access to the more capital-intensive fishing craft and gear: a new class of non-worker owners emerged.

The new technology in harvesting was introduced without providing adequate working capital and also without any change in the merchant-controlled marketing structure. This, coupled with the new and rising costs of production (particularly for fuel, repairs and maintenance) increased the dependence on

Special/Fishing



Fishermen in Ghana: small-scale fishing is labor intensive

merchant-financiers: a high level of productivity was realized but at much higher costs of production and at levels of indebtedness often leading to a gradual loss of control over the means of production.

The higher capital and operating costs coupled with the increasing demand for fish, particularly for export, led to greater effort to maximize short-run profits: the pressure to "exploit" naturality of the small-scale fishermen, the long term sustainability of fish resources and the nutritional status of the local consumers of fish. This was the situation which confronted most developing countries at the turn of the 1970s.

The dawn of the eighties found most Third World countries in a dilemma. On the one hand, largely as a preemptive step, they had to declare exclusive economic rights over vast territories of ocean as a first step in initiating the future prospects for nationally controlled industrial fishing and deep-sea operations. On the other, since fisheries development had not yielded the desired results, they had to renew the emphasis on small-scale fisheries that largely confined itself to the near-shore waters.

The first Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) World Fisheries Conference (WFC), held in Rome in July 1984, was organized to take account of the problems encountered in

fisheries development as well as the above dilemma facing Third World countries. The conference overcame the difficult task of reconciling the conflicting claims and interests in fisheries by stressing equally on the need for continued investment, enhanced international trade in fish, management of the resources and fish as food for the poor. It also stressed the need for renewed concern for the small-scale fishermen and their fisheries.

Fishworkers who met in Rome at the same time for the First International Conference of Fishworkers and their Supporters (ICFWS) did not take such a consensus approach. The conference stressed the need for fishworkers – particularly small-scale fishermen – to move from the periphery to the center of the fisheries development.

The ICFWS highlighted the desirability of the small-scale fishery sector in unambiguous terms – it is labor- and social skill-intensive, and capital and fuel saving, particularly with the option of multiple energy use. It gives rise to a decentralized settlement pattern and does not promote large income disparities. Small-scale operations are desirable since they are ecologically appropriate to the tropical aquatic ecosystems characterized by numerous species in small quantities which are widely dispersed in the near-shore waters. Small-scale fishermen



Angolans repairing their nets

are innovative and amenable to efficient improvements.

The sector is also well integrated into small-scale marketing and distribution channels which are highly efficient and managed in many countries by women. The desirability of the small-scale fisheries sector to developing countries is therefore stressed not only on social and welfare grounds but more for economic, technical, ecological and organizational reasons.

The ICFWS also urged governments to be responsive to the demand of small-scale fishermen which include the need to reserve and protect for small-scale fishing all waters accessible to it; ban all technologies that disturb the ecosystem balance through overfishing and pollution; associate local fishermen's organizations or communities in devising and implementing fishery management and regulatory measures, and, finally, respect and guarantee the fundamental right of fishworkers to free association.

Action

Conference statements are not substitutes

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for action. They are at best points of departure and sources of inspiration. It is too early to say whether the plight of small-scale fishermen has improved since the WFC or shown signs of improvement.

However, post-ICFWS initiatives of fishworkers' organizations represented in Rome point to an agenda of involvement and action in the right direction.

** In northern Philippines a small-scale fishermen's organization, CALARIZ, has taken up the call for aquarian reform, demanding that the trend towards privatization of the bays with fish pens, curtailing the area of their common fishing grounds, be stopped. Along with their supporters they investigated the details about licences for fish pens, pollution of the bays, and the unauthorized operation of trawlers in teams.

Armed with their findings they resorted to various nonviolent forms of protest against the injustice of depriving them of their traditional source of livelihood. With the greater democratization of their country, hopes are high for a better deal.

** The small fishermen of Kuala Juru in Malaysia hosted an exchange program at which small-scale fishermen from neighboring Thailand and from the Philippines spent two weeks learning the art of cockle-culturing. This fishermen-to-fishermen technology transfer is a small but right step in the direction of adopting appropriate technology.

Language, cultural and religious differences were no hindrance to mutual learning - on the contrary, it greatly reinforced the need for greater South-South solidarity to solve the common problems of the small fishermen.

** The South Indian Federation of Fishermen Societies (SIFFS), a non-governmental apex body of genuine fishermen organizations, is helping its members to market their fish collectively. The intervention is so designed that the bulk of the fish reaches the local urban and rural consumers.

With the outboard engine revolution only just reaching small-scale fishermen in South India, SIFFS has embarked on a training



Angolan youths using traditional fishing techniques

program for fishermen to demystify this new artifact by teaching them how best to handle it to minimize fuel consumption and maintenance costs. SIFFS's newly built beachlanding plywood boats (on which engines are used) are designed to use efficient sails thus encouraging fishermen to adopt a multiple-energy use pattern in order to cut operational costs and to retain their traditional expertise in sailing.

** *African fishworkers* from 13 countries met in Cape Verde recently to discuss the impact of foreign fishing vessels operating in their territorial waters on the fish harvesting capabilities and income of the small-scale fisherman. The issue of appropriate forms of economic organization for small fishermen was also a topic of concern.

The exchange helped fishermen to compare notes regarding the pros and cons of the varied experiments now in operation in their countries which include: total state control, quasi-government cooperatives and complete free enterprise.

** *ANPAC* is the association of artisanal fisherman in Colombia. With long years of rich experience, committed supporters and a magazine called *CAYUCO*, they have taken the initiative to support and strengthen the fishermen's organizations in other Latin


American countries.

Issues considered priority include: pressing governments for better planning of coastal industrial development which will reduce pollution of coastal waters; technology transfer between fishermen of different countries aided by technologies committed to the cause of the small fishermen; and lobbying to ban trawling in nearshore waters – for which they will depend heavily on experiences of small fishermen from other parts of the world.

All these actions are but small ripples and must increase in far greater numbers and force if they are to form the waves of change to re-establish for the small-scale fishermen their rightful role. However the actions of fishworkers and their supporters alone will not suffice. Governments and international organizations must move beyond verbal concern and demonstrate concrete commitment for efforts to create a more just, participating and sustainable development process in world fisheries.

John Kurien (*Associate Fellow of the Centre for Development Studies, India and former ICFWS secretary-general*). This article first appeared in the may/June 1986 issue of **International Agricultural Development**.

Humor



**IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OIL INDUSTRY FOR
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