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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Fonseca, Matheus Pereira da | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-09-12T16:09:13Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-09-12T16:09:13Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2025-04-28 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | FONSECA, Matheus Pereira da. O experimento do zumbi e a historia e-qualia ́ de Robert Kirk. 2025. 104 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Sociais, Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, Seropédica, RJ, 2025. | pt_BR |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://rima.ufrrj.br/jspui/handle/20.500.14407/23182 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Se zumbis sao conceb ̃ ́ıveis, tambem s ́ ao poss ̃ ́ıveis? A ideia de zumbi implica o epifenomenalismo? O epifenomenalismo implica a possibilidade de zumbis? O objetivo da presente pesquisa e analisar argumentos pr ́ o-zumbis e anti-zumbis ́ que respondem essas perguntas. Basicamente os zumbis sao criaturas hipot ̃ eticas ́ identicas a n ˆ os em todos os aspectos, mas sem experi ́ encia qualitativa, as cha- ˆ madas qualia. Se a concebilidade dos zumbis implicar a possibilidade de que esses seres sao metafisicamente poss ̃ ́ıveis, entao a tese fisicalista que afirma que ̃ propriedades mentais se seguem de propriedades f ́ısicas e falsa. Em meados ́ da decada de 70, Robert Kirk publica dois artigos defendendo a possibilidade ́ de zumbis contra o fisicalismo no geral – mas especialmente o funcionalismo e o behaviorismo - pois, segundo o autor, ha uma tese que ́ e compartilhada por qual- ́ quer fisicalista que se preze. Anos mais tarde, Kirk volta atras em sua posic ̧ ́ ao e ̃ passa a atacar o argumento do zumbi. Segundo ele, existe uma tese epifenome- nalista (a historia e-qualia) que implica a possibilidade de zumbis. Para o epife- ́ nomenalismo, as qualia, assim como outras propriedades e estados mentais, sao ̃ propriedades que nao t ̃ em nenhum efeito causal sobre os nossos comportamen- ˆ tos. Se for comprovado que os zumbis filosoficos s ́ ao poss ̃ ́ıveis, entao as pro- ̃ priedades qualitativas podem ser retiradas sem que isso afete o comportamento humano, o que parece estar de acordo com o epifenomenalismo. A estrategia ́ de Kirk para atacar os zumbis e mostrar que a hist ́ oria e-qualia ́ e inconceb ́ ́ıvel e, portanto, os zumbis tambem seriam inconcebíveis. | pt_BR |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES | pt_BR |
| dc.language | por | pt_BR |
| dc.publisher | Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro | pt_BR |
| dc.subject | argumento dos zumbis | pt_BR |
| dc.subject | Robert Kirk | pt_BR |
| dc.subject | qualia | pt_BR |
| dc.subject | fisicalismo | pt_BR |
| dc.subject | problema mente-corpo | pt_BR |
| dc.subject | zombie argument | pt_BR |
| dc.subject | Robert Kirk | pt_BR |
| dc.subject | physicalism | pt_BR |
| dc.subject | mind-body problem | pt_BR |
| dc.title | O experimento do zumbi e a historia e-qualia de Robert Kirk | pt_BR |
| dc.title.alternative | O experimento do zumbi e a historia e-qualia ́ de Robert Kirk | en |
| dc.type | Dissertação | pt_BR |
| dc.description.abstractOther | If zombies are conceivable, are they also possible? Does the idea of a zombie en- tail epiphenomenalism? Does epiphenomenalism entail the possibility of zom- bies? The aim of this research is to analyse pro-zombie and anti-zombie argu- ments that answer these questions. Basically zombies are hypothetical creatures identical to us in all aspects, but without qualitative experience, the so-called qualia. If the conceivability of zombies entails the possibility that these beings are metaphysically possible, then the physicalist thesis that mental properties follow from physical properties is false. In the mid-1970s, Robert Kirk published two articles defending the possibility of zombies against physicalism in general - but especially against functionalism and behaviourism - since, according to the author, there is a thesis that is shared by any serious physicalist. Years later, Kirk rejects his first position and starts attacking the zombie argument. Accor- ding to him, there is an epiphenomenalist thesis (the e-qualia story) that entails the possibility of zombies. For epiphenomenalism, qualia, as other mental pro- perties and states, are properties that have no causal effect on our behaviour. If it is proven that philosophical zombies are possible, then qualitative properties can be removed without affecting human behaviour, which seems to be in line with epiphenomenalism. Kirk’s strategy for attacking the zombies is to show that the e-qualia story is inconceivable and therefore the zombies would also be inconceivable. | en |
| dc.contributor.advisor1 | Duarte, Alessandro Bandeira | - |
| dc.contributor.advisor1ID | https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4011-5000 | pt_BR |
| dc.contributor.advisor1Lattes | http://lattes.cnpq.br/6161760196869424 | pt_BR |
| dc.contributor.referee1 | Duarte, Alessandro Bandeira | - |
| dc.contributor.referee1ID | https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4011-5000 | pt_BR |
| dc.contributor.referee1Lattes | http://lattes.cnpq.br/6161760196869424 | pt_BR |
| dc.contributor.referee2 | Guitarrari, Robinson | - |
| dc.contributor.referee2ID | https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9727-4654 | pt_BR |
| dc.contributor.referee2Lattes | http://lattes.cnpq.br/3649125210518429 | pt_BR |
| dc.contributor.referee3 | Menezes, Julia Cavalcanti Telles de | - |
| dc.contributor.referee3Lattes | http://lattes.cnpq.br/2778073868131207 | pt_BR |
| dc.contributor.referee4 | Alves, Marco Aurélio Sousa | - |
| dc.contributor.referee4ID | https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2296-2644 | pt_BR |
| dc.contributor.referee4Lattes | http://lattes.cnpq.br/1819649244388290 | pt_BR |
| dc.creator.Lattes | http://lattes.cnpq.br/6617032918285862 | pt_BR |
| dc.publisher.country | Brasil | pt_BR |
| dc.publisher.department | Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Sociais | pt_BR |
| dc.publisher.initials | UFRRJ | pt_BR |
| dc.publisher.program | Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia | pt_BR |
| dc.relation.references | ALVES, M. A. S. David chalmers e o mundo zumbi. In: TENDENCIAS ˆ CONTEMPORANEAS DE FILOSOFIA DA MENTE E CI ˆ ENCIAS COGNITIVAS ˆ . [S.l.]: PUCPRESS, 2023. v. 1, cap. Cap. 13, p. 15. 2.2.3, 28 BAARS, B. J. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 3.1.3 BAILEY, A. Zombies and epiphenomenalism. Dialogue, Cambridge University Press, v. 48, n. 1, p. 129, 2009. 4.2, 127 BALOG, K. Acquaintance and the mind-body problem. In: GOZZANO, S.; HILL, C. S. (Ed.). New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. [S.l.]: Cambridge University Press, 2012. p. 16–42. 3.3.3 CHALMERS, D. Does conceivability entail possibility. In: GENDLER, T. S.; HAWTHORNE, J. (Ed.). Conceivability and Possibility. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press, 2002. p. 145–200. 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 3.3.3, 3.3.4 CHALMERS, D. J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 2.1, 25, 3.3.3, 106 CHALMERS, D. J. Imagination, indexicality, and intensions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Wiley-Blackwell, v. 68, n. 1, p. 182–90, 2004. 4.1.2, 116 CHALMERS, D. J. The Character of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 2.2, 2.2.2, 17, 3.1.3 CHALMERS, D. J. The nature of epistemic space. In: EGAN, A.; WEATHERSON, B. (Ed.). Epistemic Modality. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press, 2011. 2.2.3 DEPOE, J. M. Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. In: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [S.l.: s.n.], 2013. 3.3.3 GOMES, L. M. Filosofia da mente, dualismo e zumbis. Cadernos PET Filosofia, v. 21, n. 1, p. 101–116, 2020. 2.2 JACKSON, F. Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, v. 32, p. 127–36, 1982. 2.1 JACKSON, F. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 10, 2.2.1, 11, 13, 14, 3.3.5 102 KHAWAJA, J. Interactionist zombies. Synthese, Springer Verlag, v. 200, 2022. 4.2, 128, 129, 130, 4.2, 4.2 KIM, J. Making sense of emergence. Philosophical Studies, Springer Netherlands, v. 95, n. 1-2, p. 3–36, 1999. 133 KIND, A. Qualia realism. Philosophical Studies, v. 104, n. 2, p. 143–62, 2001. 2 KIRK, R. Zombies v. materialists. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Wiley-Blackwell, v. 48, n. 1, p. 135–164, 1974a. 3.1.1, 31, 34, 35, 36, 41, 43, 44, 45, 48, 3.1.3 KIRK, R. Sentience and behaviour. Mind, Oxford University Press, v. 83, n. January, p. 43–60, 1974b. 3.1.2, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 3.1.3 KIRK, R. Reply to don locke on zombies and materialism. Mind, Oxford University Press, v. 86, n. April, p. 262–4, 1977. 32, 3.1.1 KIRK, R. Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK, 2005. 2.2.3, 3.2, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 81, 85, 86, 88, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 105, 109, 4.1.1, 125 KIRK, R. The inconceivability of zombies. Philosophical Studies, Springer, v. 139, n. 1, p. 73–89, 2008. 123 KIRK, R. Robots, Zombies and Us: Understanding Consciousness. New York, NY, USA: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing, Plc, 2017. 123 KRIPKE, S. A. Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980. 2.2.2 LEVINE, J. The explanatory gap. In: WEISBERG, J. (Ed.). Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). [S.l.]: Polity, 2014. 90 LEWIS, C. I. Mind and the world-order. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1929. 2.1, 3 LEWIS, D. K. An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy, v. 63, n. 1, p. 17–25, 1966. 59 MOHAMMADIAN, M. If consciousness causes collapse, the zombie argument fails. Synthese, Springer Verlag, v. 199, p. 1599–1615, 2021. 4.2 MOORE, D. On robinson’s response to the self-stultifying objection. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Springer Verlag, v. 3, n. 4, p. 627–641, 2012. 3.3.2, 97 ROBINSON, W. Epiphenomenalism. Dispon ́ıvel em: ⟨https://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/sum2023/entries/epiphenomenalism/⟩. 3.3.1 ROBINSON, W. S. Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 3.3.1, 89, 92, 3.3.2, 95, 96 103 ROBINSON, W. S. Experiencing is not observing: A response to dwayne moore on epiphenomenalism and self-stultification. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Springer Verlag, v. 4, n. 2, p. 185–192, 2013. 3.3.2, 99 RUFFINO, M. Contingent a Priori Truths: Metaphysics, Semantics, Epistemology and Pragmatics. [S.l.]: Springer Nature, 2022. 15 RUSSELL, B. On denoting. Mind, Duke University Press, v. 14, n. 56, p. 479–493, 1905. 3.3.3 RUSSELL, B. Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Pelican Books, v. 11, p. 108–28, 1910. 3.3.3 SEPETYI, D. Robert kirk’s attempted intellectual filicide: Are phenomenal zombies hurt? In: . [S.l.]: Organon F, 2022. v. 29, n. 1, p. 78–108. 3.3.5, 4.1, 112, 114, 4.1.2, 122, 4.1.3 SHOEMAKER, S. The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy, v. 79, n. 7, p. 367–, 1982. 2.1 SILBY, B. On the conceivability of zombies. In: COPELAND, J. (Ed.). Philosophy research paper series - Dept Philosophy, University of Canterbury. [S.l.: s.n.], 1998. 9 TONONI, G. The integrated information theory of consciousness. In: VELMANS, M.; SCHNEIDER, S. (Ed.). The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. [S.l.]: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007. p. 243–256. 3.1.3 TYE, M. Qualia. In: ZALTA, E. N. (Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2021. [S.l.]: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2021. 2.1 | pt_BR |
| dc.subject.cnpq | Filosofia | pt_BR |
| Appears in Collections: | Mestrado em Filosofia | |
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